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Introduction:
Tu man: Allow me once again to welcome you to this Round
Table, Intelligence and National Security at the begin-
ning of the 21st Century . I  believe we all know each
other, so there is no need for formal introductions. I am
pleased that we are gathered here together and that we are
going to discuss these topics during the next two days. In
preparation for this meeting, you have received suggestions
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for the topics to be discussed. I will briefly repeat them:  First,
Intelligence estimates of the changes in Europe in the last
decades of the 20th Century. The second one is the role
of Intelligence in conflict resolution. The third is  subjects
and methods of Intelligence agencies at the beginning of
21st century: possibilities and limits, and the fourth ethics and
legal norms for Intelligence and national security. If you agree
with these topics, we can discuss them today and tomorrow. 
May I first propose moderators to preside over our sessions.
We would like the moderators for the first session on
Intelligence estimates to be Mr. Shebarshin and Mr. Stolz. For
the second session, Mr. Jackovich and  Admiral Lacoste. For
the third, Mr. Agrell and Mr. Kerr, and for the fourth, Ethics
and legal norms, Mr. Boyadjiev and Mr. Wolf. The role of the
moderator is to stimulate participants into a lively debate and
discussion. Some participants have already given me their
contribution in written form, so there will be no need to repeat
all the arguments presented therein. Discussions will be
recorded, and after authorization will be published in the fol-
lowing issue of our journal. 
Thank you very much. We have here a group of very distin-
guished people, very knowledgeable and experienced, and I
am sure we shall have a constructive meeting. 
First session:
Intelligence estimates of the changes in Europe
at the end of the 20th Century
Estimates of the changes in the late ‘80s and ‘90s in the for-
mer socialist countries; the fall of the Berlin Wall; unification
of Germany; disintegration of former Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, USSR; dissolution of the Warsaw Pact;
enlargement of NATO and PfP; etc.
Moderators: Richard Stolz, General Leonid Shebarshin
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Stolz: I am Dick Stolz and Miro has asked the general and me
to moderate this first session. General Shebarshin has a voice
problem and I said I would do the honors and accept, and
that if I said something particularly stupid, he would inter-
vene, and he promised to do that as well. I would like to
make the commen here that we will be talking about
Intelligence estimates. We have a distinguished journalist
here who has his own views. You’ll notice the topics do not
include some very important things. What the Intelligence
agency thinks will happen, what actually did happen, and
what will happen do not necessarily coincide. Some people
think that they never coincide. I don’t take that dim a view
myself, but there is a point to be made in that it should be a
part of the discussion today. I’m speaking for myself, I hasten
to add, when I say that I think we did more or less call the
collapse of the former Soviet Union. The timing may have
been off a little, but no one knew that in 1989.  The issue
now is how do we manage, and what has happened as a
result of that collapse. That’s the word I use. Others may
have a different word. Markus Wolf can speak, of course, as
well as anyone and better then most, as to what has hap-
pened in former East Germany. My reading tells me that it is
not a very happy picture…the reunification is, to put it mild-
ly, not complete economically, socially, or politically. I think
that we really need to talk a little bit about the events of for-
mer Yugoslavia, and currently, as of today, whether we think
Macedonia is a viable country. Is Bosnia and Herzegovina a
viable country? What will really happen in Kosovo? Does
anyone seriously think that Kosovo can be an independent
State? I personally do not. What is NATO’s role or lack there-
of? I think NATO and the Intelligence Agencies may well have
been looking for a new life. What do we do now? But my
opinion is that NATO is floundering. So there we are. What
role will private entrepreneur, governmental organizations
play in the future?  I hope a larger and larger role, but who
knows. So who would like to start off first? Or do I have to
pick somebody?  I will pick Mr. Doder.
Doder: Looking at the work of Intelligence from the outside, let
me say that I’ve covered Intelligence for years for the
Washington Post in Washington, and it was going OK when
Mr. Casey was director. It is interesting to look back and see
how the American Central Intelligence Agency performed in
terms of assessment of Russia, and how the Reagan adminis-
tration, Director Casey in particular, tailored the Intelligence
to whatever his personal needs were, or the needs of a par-
ticular group.  I was in the Soviet Union from ‘81. to ‘85, and



























of the country was taking place. When you have three lead-
ers die in rapid succession, then this disintegration is more
rapid. There was practically no contact between the two gov-
ernments. You remember that the deployment of missiles in
Western Europe was traumatic for the Russians. I think they
were paranoid, but you know, as Henry Kissinger used to say,
“the fact that I’m paranoid doesn’t mean I don’t have real
enemies”. The West was really paranoid about what was
going on in Eastern Europe, and I thought that in 1983, they
were very close to war and real confrontation. I thought that
the Administration at that point also realized that things were
getting out of hand, and that they kind of backed off a bit.
And of course then Chernenko went back to introducing the
old style government and so forth. The point is that all these
assessments were available to everybody and now I realize
that - at the time I didn’t know, but I know now - that people
in the Agency had views very close to mine. In fact, I was bet-
ter informed on many issues. You know the key question is
one of national estimates. It sounds like it drives everything,
because it drives your military procurement, it drives the
budget, it taxes the resources, everything. The Reagan admin-
istration committed to pushing the rearmament program. So
the Agency, the analysts in the Agency, provided them with
assessments. Let me read to you what the head of the Soviet
and Analytical Division in the Agency testified to ten years
later. He was the director from ‘84 to ‘89, Douglas
MacEachin.  He says “the period during which I felt I had the
least impact on Policy was during the Reagan administration.
They thought of us as the enemies. The implication was that
the CIA undercut our ability to rebuild our national forces.
The administration thought the CIA was too liberal. It said we
underestimated the military strength and the Soviet threat in
the Third World.” When MacEachin came to the then direc-
tor of Intelligence, Mr. Kerr, and Mr. Kerr tried to get some of
the assessment on Soviet military Intelligence as a foot note,
he wasn’t successful. Couldn’t make a footnote, and I was
railing against the CIA all the time because what we see is
what the director, or whoever is in charge, presents. And also,
what was happening with Gorbachev? What’s happening in
Russia? It was quite clear to me that this was a major change.
When I went to the Party Congress in 1986, Gorbachev told
the country that Afganistan was a bleeding wound. I inter-
preted this as a foretaste of what was to come, since a polit-
ical leader doesn’t say something like this unless he plans to
do something about it. In this case, quite clearly withdraw,
because they couldn’t win. When Gates was Casey’s deputy,


























Senate Intelligence Board about Gorbachev’s reform and so
forth. His answer was the following: “quite frankly, without
any hint that such mental changes are going on, my
resources do not permit me the luxury of just idly speculating
on what a different Soviet Union might look like.”  It’s March
16, 1986. The thrust of my paper, and this is something that
Markus Wolf has in his book, is that all Intelligence agencies
are toys in the hands of political masters.
Shebarshin: The main conflict of the last century was the clash
between the two economic and political systems represented
by the USA and the USSR. The disintegration of the USSR and
the Warsaw Pact put an end to the conflict, which had deter-
mined the directions, priorities, and methods of all major and
lesser Intelligence services of the world. The change in the
international situation was so drastic that some politologists
got carried away and began to write about the end of histo-
ry. But history never ends and never takes a respite. It is time
now to think about the kind of conflicts which might deter-
mine the destiny of the world in the 21st century.  And natu-
rally, Intelligence services are ever present in the real or virtu-
al area of the conflict. For the time being, the global situation
seems to be more or less stable, due to the immense military
and economic might of the United States and its NATO allies.
(It ought to be noted that this kind of stability is not necessar-
ily beneficial to the rest of the world) 
But even this imperfect stability will be challenged by tremen-
dous problems which will inevitably arise in the 21st century.
The main challenge will be, or already is, the growing inca-
pacity of the world energy resources to support the further
development of modern civilization in its present form.
Imminent shortages of energy will make oil, gas, and urani-
um a mighty weapon in the hands of those who control the
resources, and a coveted target for those who lack them.  The
intensification of conflict seems to be inevitable.  It would
hardly be realistic to expect the development of the conflict to
be peaceful.  The compulsion to use force is growing.  Look
at Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan.  The world has not become a
safer place.  
It would be naïve to presume that the present-day configura-
tion of world forces will remain stable forever. Look at the
technological, economic, and military progress of China and
India, for instance.  The subject could be elaborated on ad
infinitum, but one conclusion is clear:  we face not the end of





























Dedijer:  When I began my intelligence courses in 1973 at Lund
University in Sweden, I asked myself:  What  knowledge did
the Communist Yugoslav leaders under Tito lack about the
world which prevented them from developing their country
effectively? I discovered that they lacked global intelligence;
that is, knowledge about the trends and dynamics of world
changes.  I had already realized that the Communist system
had lost its battle with capitalism.  Mine was the first open
course on Intelligence in a European university, and perhaps
in the world, and as a result of this, I was invited to lunch at
the Cosmos Club in Washington, D.C.  by William Colby,
former head of CIA, who told me that I was breaking a lot of
myths about Intelligence with my courses.  During that  lunch
in l976, I asked him what he thought would happen with the
USSR and was surprised to hear him say that “We don’t have
to worry about the USSR! They will collapse!« This idea was
first expressed openly in l947 by George Kennan and
President Truman at the start of the Cold War. Two years after
this lunch, I read an article in the Moscow »Komunist« by
Rumintsev of the KGB Insitute, stating that the Communist
regime in the USSR was based on a cult of secrecy and not
on a culture of open information. Today, as William Colby, I
myself, and a number of students of Intelligence perceived,
we live in a new Intelligence and security revolution.
Now we are witnessing the globalization of all aspects of
society by the »new deal« based on the enlightened capital-
ism of the U.S., European Union, and Japan, and this has
become the principal proponent of social change in the glob-
al society.  This is illustrated by the current changes in China,
Russia, and other former Communist countries, and in the
third world countries, which is how I estimate the world
changes in the intelligence and security (I&S) efforts in the
21st century.
However, intelligence estimates can also mean estimates of
intelligence and security efforts in the world.  During the Cold
War, the I&S government budgets were extremely secret, but
this was not always the case. As early as April l9l2, the
Government of Britain published a white paper which I dis-
covered in the Library of Congress:  “Annual expenditure on
Secret Services by the governments of Austro-Hungary,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia«. Today, the
U.S. spends 30 billion dollars on Federal government I&S
entities, and another 50 billion dollars on private, corporate,



























business intelligence, estimating the market at 70 billion dol-
lars.  In l975, in an interview with the “Corriera della Sera”,
I foresaw that the main investment in intelligence & security
would be made by business, which is happening now.
Doder: I think that the individuals do matter, it does matter who
comes to take charge in a given situation. I mean, in the
Soviet Union it clearly mattered that Gorbachev took power.
In Yugoslavia it clearly mattered that Miloševiæ came to
power. Imagine that Miloševiæ had been in South Africa
instead of Nelson Mandela. There would have been a blood
bath. 
Lacoste: I would like to refer to De Gaulle’s ideas in the sixties,
when the two military blocs were facing off in Europe.  The
danger of a new, third world war between the West and the
East was very high.  De Gaulle was convinced that such a sit-
uation could not last forever.  He did not accept that world
politics would be dominated for years and years by such a
dangerous bipolar system.  He pointed out that our European
“brothers” were living on both sides of the Iron Curtain, push-
ing for a new Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals.”
But such views were not understood or accepted by our
American allies, who had the responsibility of preserving the
world’s security and who had, in 1947, opted for the “con-
tainment policy”.  In those times, the White House and the
State Department were very angry with De Gaulle; anger was
at its peak when he withdrew the French military forces from
the integrated structures of NATO, and when he obliged
those allied military forces stationed on French territory –
essentially American air forces and NATO headquarters – to
leave the country and to build new infrastructures in other
European countries; for example, in Belgium.  De Gaulle was
portrayed as a traitor to the Allied cause.  However, in fact,
he never betrayed the Atlantic Alliance.  When very danger-
ous crises took place, namely the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban
missile crisis, he immediately informed President Kennedy that
France was wholeheartedly behind him in opposing
Kruschchev’s aggressive initiatives, saying:  “I am at your
side, no problem, you took the right decisions, I agree and I
concur.”  Then a few years later, tensions abated and his
prophetic views were gradually shared by all the leaders of
the Atlantic Alliance; instead of brutal hostility, we had
détente and arms limitation treaties. 
However, I have observed that, several years after the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, there
are still difficulties in building positive links with Russia.  We
escaped the dangers of a nuclear confrontation, but we have



























political revolution in the former Soviet Union was followed
by a terrible economic disaster.  This can lead to a new, dan-
gerous authoritarian regime, because the Russian people will
become increasingly resentful toward the rich, Western dem-
ocratic powers who were not able to help the country recov-
er and stabilize its economy.  Poverty and despair have been
the source of many past conflicts.  I remember that Hitler’s
election was one of the consequences of the German defeat
in 1918, the Versailles Treaty, and the Great Depression of
1929.
I would like to address another issue directly connected to the
economic and political turmoil:  the growing power of
transnational criminal activities.  I wrote a book in 1992
about the dangers of the “Mafia syndrome”.  I had observed
that opening the borders and allowing free circulation of
people, goods, and financial assets were highly dangerous in
the absence of strict security measures, as this provided new
opportunities for clever “godfathers” running the Mafias. In
1992, few people admitted these dangers or thought that our
societies could be threatened by them.  Today, observing the
Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts, I must say that my predictions
were accurate; it is clear that criminal gangs and arms smug-
glers are playing a major role in these horrible wars.
Organized crime and mafia systems disregard borders.  They
shift from country to country, taking advantage of the dis-
crepancies between national legislations in order to escape
countermeasures by law enforcement agencies.  I believe
these new threats should be a major concern for all secret
services, not just the police forces. 
Tu man: Can I put the question another way? What we like to
talk about are Intelligence estimates and to see if those esti-
mates exist and were accurate at that time. Actually, at that
time, I didn’t know anything about the existence of
Intelligence estimates. So the question for me is, if there real-
ly were estimates from any side that the Warsaw Pact would
collapse, then wouldn’t this mean the disintegration of
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union as well?
We know, for example, that in 1989 there was a leak of infor-
mation from the States, probably the CIA,  that Yugoslavia
would disintegrate. In spite of that, we saw in 1990 and 1991
that the American foreign policy was focusing on the econo-
my as the main problem of former Yugoslavia, and because
of that, Americans supported Ante  Markoviæ as Premier, and
invested large amounts money and effort to solve the eco-
nomic problem and keep Yugoslavia together. All the assess-


























crises focused on advocating human rights and a market
economy, claiming that if those criteria were met, everything
would be hunky dory in former Yugoslavia. Then war broke
out in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, a year ago, in
Kosovo. Another example, even when the process for the
independence of Croatia was underway, is an American
diplomat who told the late Croatian Defense Minister, Gojko
Šušak: “Don’t even dream about the independence of
Croatia. Even your great grandson won’t live to see that”.
The question is, were there real Intelligence estimates on the
disintegration of Yugoslavia, or was there just one monolith-
ic view, with all the other sources pointing in the opposite
direction? What I do believe is that, in the absence of a prop-
er diagnosis, we cannot talk about the future.  If we don’t
recognize reality, we cannot understand the situation and the
processes of the disintegration of Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, or the unifi-
cation of Germany. How good were Intelligence products in
the late 1980s and 1990s?
Stolz: Thank you, Miro. First of all, I want to mention
Czechoslovakia again. When Tito drew a crowd of 100,000
people in Prague in April, 1968, and when you heard that
crowd shouting ‘Ti-to, Ti-to, Ti-to’, you knew that the Soviets
couldn’t stand that for much longer. 
Leijonhielm:My name is Jan Leijonhielm and I am the former
head of the Swedish equivalent of Economic Intelligence.  At
present I am in charge of Russian studies at the Swedish
Defense Research Agency. In answer to your question con-
cerning the relative or the real knowledge about the crises in
Southern Europe and Russia/Soviet Union, I think there are
different levels of knowledge needed for the detection of
these crises.  I believe there are also certain common denom-
inators in the inability of Intelligence services to foresee
events, and especially to convey the message to the politi-
cians, something which Mr. Doder brought up, and this is an
interesting question. I would argue that systematic errors built
into the Intelligence agencies will decrease their capacities
and harm their links to the political level. This relationship is
crucial. There are human related errors and there are sys-
temic errors, which I believe would be interesting to discuss,
and later perhaps we could talk about what this audience
thinks in regard to future crises; where they will appear and
what shape they will take. Admiral Lacoste said, for example,
that the real danger after the collapse of the Soviet Union was
an economic one. This danger was also present in disinte-
grated and segregated countries, which led to a series of



























topic which should be taken into account. The performance
and the relationship between smaller, private Intelligence and
security institutions, which I think is perhaps as important a
subject as the relationship between developed countries in
the future. So these reflections give no answers but rather
pose more questions.
Jackovich: I am Victor Jackovich from the United States. I
thought some very interesting comments were made, starting
with Duško Doder and Mr. Tuðman, who spoke about the
nature of national security and Intelligence, and how they are
integrated into governmental decisions. I think for me the real
problem occurs after estimates have been made, though we
saw that some estimates have not been accurate. But it is a
question of the integration of political preferences that tends
to override this, and I am sure that during the course of the
day and a half that we will be here, we will be discussing this
in some detail. In the case of Yugoslavia, the estimate that
there would be a collapse and that the collapse would take
place with great bloodshed and great violence wasn’t, in
fact, considered very accurate, because it clashed with the
political preference that Yugoslavia continue as a single state.
So what we found was that the estimate was there, the pre-
diction was there, but we carried on with the preference for
what we thought were good reasons, not only because of
Yugoslavia, but because we saw the Soviet Union through
Yugoslavia.  We continued on with the extra-regional preju-
dices.  I know you want to get into Intelligence estimates. I
find some of the comments extremely interesting, especially
by Admiral Lacoste, on the challenges of organized crime,
not only because of its strength and national nature, but
because it has the potential to penetrate the services them-
selves. What I mean by penetration of the services themselves
is that the services sometimes use organized crime elements
in order to find, identify, and fight against organized crime,
but sometimes the organized crime elements are so organ-
ized and wealthy that they turn the situation around. Then you
find your tradecraft very much inundated by the criminal ele-
ments, and there’s penetration of the services. It’s an inter-
esting issue for later in the discussion. I just wanted to focus
on the discrepancy, and how one integrates national security
with political options. Just let me go back to that period for a
moment.  Probably on the cusp between Bush Senior’s
administration and the first Clinton administration where the
estimates were there, the political preference was indeed stat-
ed for the continuation of Yugoslavia as a single state,
although as a democratic single state, democratically and


























options that would seem to be called for by an estimate that
predicted dissolution were not developed, so that we found
ourselves in a situation where we were facing the emergence
of mini-states, but had not really matured or reconciled our
policies towards the realities on the ground.  
Dedijer: The Idea of Yugoslavia, of the union of Southern Slav
peoples, was formulated in Croatia in the l9th century by
Bishop Strossmayer and Mazuranich, and was implemented
by politicians, for example Supilo, in the 20th century. In l9l5,
he came to Serbian Prime Minister Pasich, whose government
was based in the town of Nish - as the Austrians had occu-
pied Belgrade - and warned that Italy wanted to take over
Dalmatia.  Pasich asked my father, the geographer Yevt
Dedijer: “What is Dalmatia?«.  Dedijer wrote a brochure pub-
lished in May l9l5 describing Dalmatia, and ending with a
graph representing the growth of »Great Serbia« in square
kilometers since the year 1200, and predicted in it that in the
future, it would comprise all the area inhabited by Croats,
Slovenes, Macedonians, and Albanians. This idea of Great
Serbia was Milosevic’s guiding concept in the four wars he
started in former Yugoslavia. In Croatia, you have advocates
of »Great Croatia«, and in Kosovo, advocates of »Great
Albania«. These are the Balkan proponents of the romantic
nationalism that prevailed in Europe in the l8th and l9th cen-
turies.
Kerr: It is very difficult to know where to intervene in this discus-
sion, because there are a number of themes, but let me just
make a comment on Ambassador Jackovich’s point about
Yugoslavia. In 1989, the Intelligence community did produce
a rather comprehensive and reasonably accurate estimate on
the future of Yugoslavia. It turned out not to have been so
bloody, but it was still a dark picture, and it was unusual, in
that it was clear. I mean a lot of estimates are fuzzy and
ambiguous, but I think this estimate, in fact, was a clear esti-
mate. 
There were a number of reasons why I think it was not acted
upon. One is that it is easy to describe a problem, as the
Ambassador said.  The problem was enormous, and the out-
come was disagreeable. It meant a fundamental change that
we did not want, from our perspective. The other thing is, you
have to think about what was going on in the world in 1989
when that estimate came out. What was happening in Eastern
Europe? In the Soviet Union? What was going to happen only
a year later with the war with Iraq?  I would argue that peo-
ple like Larry Eagleburger, who was then the Secretary of
State and was also was very interested in Yugoslavia, were



























burning issues at that moment, not future problems in
Yugoslavia, but issues of importance at that very moment. So
you can’t pull these problems out and deal with them as if
they stand alone, you have to place them in a much larger
context. 
If I can go back to something that Mr. Doder said earlier, I
think when you look at United States Intelligence estimates of
what was happening, primarily with the Soviet Union - which
was our focus between 1980 – 1988 -  during the two
Reagan administrations, and then the Intelligence relation-
ship, I would disagree to some degree that we didn’t have
access to or direct involvement with the policy makers. We
did. We saw them everyday. We saw all the senior people
everyday. We had great opportunity to see them. They were
reading the product. But you have to again think of what was
going on from 1980 – 1988. There was a very tense rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union all over the world. We had lots
of little fires and confrontations. Afganistan was just one of
many, but it was a very confrontational world, and we had an
administration that considered the Soviet Union the enemy
from the dark side, and it was bound and determined to take
action to limit and change that. Bill Casey came in as an
Intelligence officer, not at all interested, not really interested
in what the Intelligence analyst had to say. He was interested
in what you could do about it, where you could exert pressure
and change the outcome.
Dedijer:  Colonel  North is the product of Casey.
Kerr: But Casey had other interesting things to use. And
Intelligence officers during this period also were involved in
this military confrontation. Military forces continued to be
built up. So nobody would have thought it made any sense if
they had heard from an Intelligence officer in the 1980’s that
the Soviet Union was going to end and break up in 1989.
What we did say during that period was that the economic
system was in decline, but we had been saying that since
1975. I don’t think even in hindsight you could have said in
the early or mid  80’s that the Soviet Union was going to col-
lapse. In fact, I would have been very interested in Iraq. It
seems very clear to me that Gorbachev didn’t expect that.  I
don’t think Gorbacov was trying to cause the end of the
Soviet Union; he was trying to make changes that would
make it capable of dealing in the future with a different kind
of world. So he didn’t predict the outcome. I used to argue
with one of my officers.  I said, “you expect me to predict the
outcome when not even the principle players  know the out-
come?” We can talk about the implications of that, perhaps,


























would like to say one more thing about Mr. Doder’s com-
ment. I was involved in writing the daily product that went to
the President. I read it every night,  I was the last person to
read it. At 8:00 at night we put it to bed and then updated it.
Mr. Casey never looked at that product, never came in and
said “I want you to change that, I don’t like the message that
you are conveying.” He would call me the next day and tell
me that. After he read it, then he would write a note to the
President or to the National Security Advisor or to someone
else saying  “I don’t agree at all”.  He thought himself as a
independent person, independent in the CIA, but he never
caused me to change a word. I have a lot of strips off my
back from him, but he never changed anything before it went





























The role of Intelligence in conflict resolution
(crises and wars in South-East Europe)
The role of national Intelligence estimates; national strategies
and international agreements; the relationship between
Intelligence and policy-makers; bilateral cooperation of
Intelligence services; Intelligence support to international com-
munity and international forces /UNPROFOR, UNCRO, IFOR,
SFOR, KFOR etc./
Moderators: Ambassador V. Jackovich, Admiral P. Lacoste
Jackovich: I would like to begin the afternoon session. I am very
honored to be asked to moderate this session with Admiral
Lacoste. Perhaps we should start with the second point on the
Round Table agenda, which is the role of Intelligence in con-
flict resolution in crisis situations; for example, in the wars in
Southeast Europe, and, specifically, the role of cooperation of
Intelligence services with international forces, with the inter-
national community in operations such as SFOR, UNPRO-
FOR, KFOR, IFOR. Probably a lot of FOR’s will be coming
up in the future. 
The discussion this morning was very freewheeling, which is
fine, but perhaps we should start this discussion with some
coverage about national Intelligence estimates, security and
Intelligence estimates, and the relationship to specific inter-
national operations. I would immediately throw the floor
open to anyone who would like to make a point on this or
expand on a point that was made this morning. We talked
about actions taken and not taken, options offered and not
offered. In terms of context, one of the important points that
shines through, for me at least, was the fact that in hindsight,
we often look back at the past and try to analyze past actions,
losing track of the fact that we have a context, that there was
an international context, that there were distractions. The
attention of policymakers is torn in many different directions,
and they also weigh the consequences of their actions. One
of the things that I did when I was in Bosnia, for example, was
a mechanism that I developed myself, but I subsequently dis-
covered that others in similar situations have adopted the
same mechanism. I absolutely forbade my people to send
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back policy recommendations out of the zone, out of the war
zone. I did this because I felt that we were the least qualified
to do so. I felt that we were the best qualified to give infor-
mation about what was happening on the ground. This hap-
pened in this village today, yesterday, whatever. This many
people were casualties. This sort of military action was taken.
We were on the ground and we could witness the event and
send dispatches back and tell the government about it.  But I
also told my people that we were the least qualified to deter-
mine what to do about that in a global context. The discus-
sion this morning, the contextuality, was a special point for
me for that reason
Kerr: One thing seems to be increasingly important and very dif-
ficult, much harder for the US than other countries: our abil-
ity to maintain constant liaison and involvement with our
allies and friends, and sometimes even our opponents. There
is a lot of criticism in this current political campaign that the
U.S. has not maintained its relationships, letting contacts go
down. Consequently, when we need them and expect every-
one to respond to our needs, nothing happens. I am struck
by how complicated it is for the US to try to touch base with
all those people that are involved in a particular problem or
crisis. Maintaining those relationships with international
organizations, all the nations that are involved, and keeping
them organized and orchestrated, is an enormous task unless
the government is exceptionally well-organized. In some
administrations, everybody goes off and does their own thing
independently, without any general guidance. In other admin-
istrations, it’s very tightly orchestrated and carefully con-
trolled by a very small number of people.  Every crisis involves
different players and a different set of circumstances, so the
responses are often very uneven. It’s very hard to coordinate
across the U.S. government because of the sheer scope and
breadth of it.
Tu man:  I’d like to relate some of our experiences. We started
to organize our Intelligence community at the beginning of
the ‘90s, and from the very beginning, we established a lot of
relations with foreign services, because they were interested
in the regional crises. My experience is that when we were
discussing the reality of the crises, wherever they were -
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, or Kosovo – the
Intelligence estimates among the services were basically the
same. We all shared the same or similar views on these basic
questions: What is the situation? Who are the main actors?
What are their objectives? How can these actors or subjects
succeed in realizing their objectives? The problem arose
when we had to address the political solutions imposed by26
powerful countries or the so-called international community.
The fact is that they had proper Intelligence at their disposal,
but still were not formulating and promoting the best political
solutions.  I personally don’t think the focus was on resolving
the political problem in the area but, rather,  satisfying the
national interests or objectives at home. I will use just one
example, the Dayton Agreements for Bosnia and
Herzegovina. From the very beginning, everyone was in favor
of the agreement, but such an agreement can only function if
the political structure is built from the bottom up, not from the
top down.  Only the three nations, the three peoples, can
establish the necessary relations, infrastructure, and so on,
within an atmosphere of confidence.
The publicly announced objectives of the international com-
munity about their presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina were
not primarily to resolve the problem of Bosnia and
Herzegovina itself. More often the objectives were to demon-
strate the main role of NATO, to prove that the mechanism of
European security was working, to implement international
criteria and standards, but not to solve the problem of those
three peoples living on that territory. That is one part of the
problem. The other problem arose with the implementation of
Intelligence estimates on the level of the international com-
munity. Basically, the Intelligence was exchanged only on a
bilateral level, and because of that, we sometimes had prob-
lems when it came to multilateral cooperation. Another
example based on Croatian experience: we have run a lot of
joint projects or operations with other services in support of
SFOR, IFOR, UNCRO, UNPROFOR, etc. When we ran those
bilateral joint operations with the Americans, for the benefit
of NATO, we believed that there was multilateral collabora-
tion, and that at least the higher NATO officials were
informed about it. Then we learned that NATO had not been
informed at all. That is an example of how the role of part-
ners on a multilateral level is often not recognised at all, the
actual role of the partners.  It’s often not even known who the
partners were.
Stolz: With regard to the question of multinational Intelligence
cooperation, I guess I would have to say I am pessimistic that
it will be achieved in any significant way.  Actually you will
hear every once in a while that the UN ought to have a
Intelligence service.  It’s just not going to happen in a prac-
tical way.
Tu man: Obviously there are certain areas where only bilateral
cooperation is possible, so I am not talking about that. A year
ago I was in Washington, and we were discussing and eval-


























overview of the last five years of cooperation, with a number
of Intelligence products produced on the basis of joint oper-
ations. We were informed about how many Intelligence prod-
ucts, based on our cooperation, were produced for the
President of the United States, State Department, Chief of
Staff, or for different European commanders of the NATO
forces. Most of those Intelligence consumers were Americans,
but the problem was that those people were not informed that
a portion of their Intelligence was provided thanks to
American cooperation with Croatian Intelligence services. I
am not saying that users of Intelligence products have to
know the origin of each piece of information. My point is that
they have to know who the key partners or providers of their
Intelligence are. At least it should be known to a certain num-
ber of people. That knowledge is relevant, especially in polit-
ical crises, and especially if the partners themselves are
involved of the crises. Both sides have to know whether the
partnership is part of the problem or part of the solution.
Leijonhielm: I see, as the chairman pointed out from the start,
two related problems. One concerns a UN Intelligence
dimension and the other the relationship between strategic
and tactical or operational Intelligence, which seems to be a
missing link. I admit that it will be extremely difficult to create
a UN Intelligence unit which perhaps could not even be
called that, but on the other hand, it seems possible to cre-
ate an Intelligence task force for special missions to function
as a sort of information umbrella. Helene Boatner pointed
out in her recent article in the first issue of  National Security
and the Future that if the parties involved in special missions
under a UN umbrella agree beforehand on technical and
other practical means, it is much easier to transform nation-
al Intelligence into an operational and unilateral Intelligence
unit once the mission is initiated. So preparations should be
made beforehand, but the UN has, in fact, stopped that
process. The other problem which we should consider is that
at the operational level, you must have a steady flow of
information on what is happening at the strategic and politi-
cal levels. You are otherwise left in the dark. We have studied
this problem and come to some conclusions. The lessons
learned have so far been negative, but there is a ways to go.
You could, for example, try a scenario-building technique.
One or two strategic scenarios could be applied to current
events at the operational level, and these would be pegged
to each scenario so as to create a better understanding of
what is going on in a broader context. There is another spe-
cial problem connected to Intelligence in unilateral missions.



























Intelligence (HUMINT) is much more important than signal
Intelligence (SIGINT). A method must therefore be created to
use HUMINT more effectively, while still protecting one’s
sources from the other participants in the operation. I don’t
have an answer to that, but would just like to bring up the
problem. Another important aspect is that if you have a unit-
ed Intelligence force, you must have a common view, so as
to avoid misunderstandings in the future.
Jackovich: If I am hearing this right, it seems to me that there
would be some utility in sharing some operational informa-
tion on a specific issue and specific crises, but obviously there
is a lot of conditionality involved, because the national inter-
ests of each service are going to be paramount. There was a
comment I’m sure you have all seen by the head of the
Russian Intelligence service in connection with the Ames case
in 1994.  He said something to the effect that “there are
friendly states, but there no friendly Intelligence services.”
Doder: I would like to raise a specific question about Bosnia.
How good is Intelligence in Bosnia? If it’s national, if each
side has its own national interest, then as a journalist, should
I go to the front with the Muslim forces and get shot at by the
Serbs?  In this case, the Serbs are my enemy because they
could kill me.  If I go with the other side, the Muslims are my
enemies because they are shooting at me.  I am the same
person trying to be as impartial as I can be.  So how good is
your Intelligence? What do these people want, apart from the
cliché that they are savages, that their ancient hatreds cannot
be resolved? Has anybody ever thought about it?
Smith: I think their objective is to stay alive in this case, and the
case you’re talking about is territory. Their objectives are
pretty limited, I think, but the Intelligence that we are interest-
ed in collecting is, first, what’s going on in the front lines. It’s
very basic Intelligence. Then, second, anything which would
threaten NATO troops and force protection has became the
aim of Intelligence, any place where there is a military threat.
So Intelligence consists of worrying about some group not
under control, in the case of Bosnia, and about one of the
three parties that has for whatever reason decided to target a
NATO element. That is Intelligence.
Doder: If that’s Intelligence, then you are better off reading
newspapers, because you have limited yourself to activities
which provide no direction to leaders on how to deal with the
situation.  A political problem has to be solved in part by
political means.  Action has to be taken from the outside by
great powers. 



























Tu man: Well, that is one thing. But then why do you believe that
a fourth party or the international community automatically
has the right position, the correct solution? 
Doder: It costs a lot of money, you see. Bosnia so far has cost
more then 5 billion dollars in non-military expenditures. That
is a lot of money.
Tu man: It’s a lot of money and no solution.
Doder: A lot of money and no solution. Shouldn’t we invest
money not to hear what the leaders say, but what the people
say? I don’t know how you do that. I’m not in the Intelligence
business.
Tu man: There have been a lot of estimates in last five or six
years about the Dayton Agreement. There is nothing, in my
opinion, which needs to be corrected in those estimates. They
were accurate then and are still accurate. The basic conclu-
sion was that the Dayton agreement would not function if the
structure were built from the top down, and I think that most
of us will agree on that. Why was this type of structure then
implemented? What good then is Intelligence in the resolu-
tion of conflicts, or the impact of Intelligence on the resolu-
tions proposed to resolve the conflict?
Doder: I think you have to look at it this way.  You have to pro-
vide your customers, that is, your national leaders, with the
best possible assessment of the situation so that when they
talk to other people, they can feel secure and know how to
proceed. This is conflict resolution, because if they go into a
meeting with a chairman and know exactly what the situation
is, then they can actually agree on something. If they go in
without an accurate picture, they can be manipulated.
Agrell: We have moved to a fundamental issue: what is actually
conflict resolution, what is the international community doing
when it is solving conflicts? Is it solving its own collective or
national problems relating to the conflict? This is precisely
what Mr. Tuðman is saying we experienced in the 1990’s.
The European security system is basically an introverted secu-
rity system that functions mainly to resolve short-term internal
problems which arose from the conflicts in the Balkans. Its
main focus is not to solve the conflicts in the Balkans, but to
solve those problems created through the media and public
opinion, and address political frustrations within the
European Union and with the countries themselves. This
explains why a number of actions taken were not functional
or appear pointless. But they were not completely pointless,
because they served another purpose, and this is the expla-
nation as to why the Dayton agreement was built from the top
down.  This was a way of solving the Western problem with



























remove the conflict from the top of the agenda, and Dayton
succeeded in that, although it has not solved the conflict and
will not solve the conflict.   There is a lot of knowledge to be
collected from the mistakes and failures in the 1990s. When
UNPROFOR was organized in the spring of 1992, it was
done without the even the most basic Intelligence assess-
ments. That is why the UNPROFOR headquarters is based in
Sarajevo, in a pleasant, faraway place with good communi-
cations. That is why it was placed there. Lots of nice restau-
rants and an airport and so forth.
The same goes for the planned location of the main logistics
base for UNPROFOR in Banja Luka, which was ideally situ-
ated in Northern Bosnia, and had a good line of communi-
cation to the conflict areas in Croatia. Everything upside
down, as we know now, and of course with some kind of
Intelligence we should have been able to predict this at that
time. I think the whole UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina from 1992 up to the end in 1995 can be char-
acterized as a tremendous Intelligence failure on the tactical
as well as the strategic level, because I have the impression
that the UNPROFOR never understood the war in Bosnia.
They never fully understood what was going on, and this
explains the debacles in 1995.  The UNPROFOR leadership
simply did not understand what was going on.  
Another aspect is the role of the NGOs. In contrast, they have
certainly learned to play the game and operate through the
media; that is, achieve results not by going directly to the
political decision-makers, but by influencing the media. This
media policy has been much more elaborate than what gov-
ernment agencies have achieved.  I would suggest that some
of the NGOs should actually be regarded as Intelligence
organizations, since the organization is basically collecting,
analyzing, and distributing information; for example, Human
Rights Watch, which is basically an Intelligence organization.
This means that we have other actors in the Intelligence field.
They might even be superior to national Intelligence agencies
in some aspects. Certainly we have seen in a number of cases
that Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International has been
more rapid, more detailed in its reports about events taking
place in conflict zones such as Algeria, in Kosovo and
Rwanda.  The question is whether or not to regard the NGOs
as targets for Intelligence activities.  If they are so influential,
then their decision making processes and their priorities must
be regarded as one of the factors fundamental to world pol-
itics. But how do states direct Intelligence activities against



























Doder: The crucial role of the NGOs and the media is obvious,
I think. What is happening in the media is absolutely fantas-
tic; it’s such a big change that you have to take it into
account. Here’s an anecdotal example: Leon Panetta, the
White House Chief of Staff, is woken up at 2 in the morning
by White House security. A small plane had just landed on the
grounds of the White House and a security man is reporting
to the Chief of Staff on the incident. Panetta asked a few
questions before he discovered that the security an’s infor-
mation was based on CNN reporting. Did you go outside
and see it? he asked him. No, the security man replied.  He
saw it on CNN. Now this may sound like a parody, but it
shows how people approach information. And in this context,
the NGO becomes an important player in a third world con-
flict situation. You have a reporter in Kosovo equipped with a
cell phone and a satellite dish. But the American audience
does not want to watch people who do not speak English.
The audience doesn’t like voiceovers. So reporters interview
NGOs. They and some contract employees of international
organizations have been the source of much misinformation
about the Kosovo war. All the governments involved were
also generating misinformation.  We were told that hundreds
of thousands of people were dead or presumed dead. The
NGOs repeat these figures. And the whole system of infor-
mation getspolluted. In an era of instant communication, we
have an illusion of knowledge because we see live pictures. 
Dedijer: I suggest that you write an article for the Washington
Post. That is, what is the world expenditure on Intelligence
and security by different countries? The United States spends
approximately 28 – 30 billion. How much is France’s,
Russia’s, Sweden’s, Bulgaria’s, and Croatia’s ? 
Doder: I think you know in the case of American Intelligence,
most of that money goes into monitoring and you know it’s
all technical. It’s not like Russia in 1912. 
Kerr: Just to comment on that. Most of the money that goes to
technical Intelligence is for military purposes and not for what
we are talking about. It is quite different. But let me ask a
question. These NGOs I find kind of interesting because they
are extra governmental and they are often on the other side
of a problem,  because they are pushing a problem while the
government is sometimes trying to stay out of it. I have to
comment on something you said. You described them as pro-
viding Intelligence, and they don’t provide Intelligence from
my perspective; they provide information. I think that is a very
fundamental difference. I look at Intelligence as information
which undergoes a validation process and is then applied to



























objective or a government problem.  Information has no
objective. For instance, I don’t consider what Duško does to
be Intelligence. It is not done to help the government order
its priorities or resolve its problems. It’s done for quite differ-
ent reasons. I think that is an important dinstinction. I would
be interested in your response.
Agrell: Can I respond immediately? I think that you are 95% cor-
rect. Traditionally the NGOs, especially in the field of human
rights, have been providing information, and have built their
credibility on providing objective information on events which
have happened. 
Doder: In Kosovo this was not the case.
Agrell: Although this wasn’t always the case, I think now that
they have gone more and more into the field of politics. This
is distorting their traditional rule of reporting established
facts, and Kosovo is the case where this happened. Because
if you look at the NGOs in the 1990s, they have been mov-
ing away from simply reporting to making policy recommen-
dations. That is why I used the word Intelligence, because
they are actually starting to assume an Intelligence role. They
are working as information collectors as well as  providers,
and these two roles conflict with one another.  You don’t
know whether they are simply reporting the facts or whether
they themselves are actors. 
Dedijer: There are 25,000 NGOs in the world today, and they
are all bureaucratic. They don’t have any social control sys-
tem. Business has profit controls; if you don’t make a profit,
you’re out. But all these organizations are terribly bureau-
cratic, regardless of their goals. 
Tu man: Just to add a comment on NGOs and what you men-
tioned before. It is not always clear whether we are talking
about NGOs, because sometimes they appear to be NGOs
but are not.  I estimate that there are 5,000 non-govern-
mental associations in Croatia. It is an enormous number,
which is an indication itself of something. Some of them have
secure communication, and nobody knows where the money
is coming from, nobody knows to whom are they reporting,
and they are providing political judgements and questionable
findings. Another fact, probably common in transition coun-
tries, is that there is no legal foundation about what NGOs
are allowed or not allowed to do. Then we have to ask what
the real criteria are for NGOs. Is it independence from gov-
ernment sources or not? How do we define an NGO?
Sometimes they are very close to the domestic government,
and sometimes to another government, but that is not the
main point. Obviously the media,  NGOs, Intelligence serv-


























information belongs to different categories of knowledge,
which have different goals and values to satisfy. In the media,
you can find whatever you want to support your particular
thesis, especially in turbulent times or in transition countries
where no protection exists in the area of national interests or
privacy. There are basically no professional rules. What kind
of valid, long-term, relevant information or knowledge can
we can expect from such sources? Because of this, I rarely
read the newspapers.  What we really need is to better under-
stand the essence of Intelligence. What is information, what
are NGO findings, what are diplomatic messages? That
enables a better understanding of the world of knowledge. 
Jackovich: It’s hard to follow everything out there, because
there is so much, and you are right. How do you filter it, the
information that is there? But one must have access to it, treat
it in a particular manner, and be careful of it.  I’m reminded
here of the famous CNN reporter that was in Bosnia at the
time, Christiane Amanpour, and what she said during a pres-
idential town hall meeting with President Clinton. They were
recording this town hall meeting with the President, and all of
a sudden they beamed in Christiane Amanpour, and you
could hear shelling in the background and see refugees run-
ning around, and on camera she asked the President, “Mr.
President, what are you doing about Bosnia?” If you were in
President Clinton’s shoes, it would be a tough situation, and
it is not something where you can say, “well, let me assess
this, or I’ll do that.” It’s very immediate, and millions of peo-
ple are watching.  There is an immediacy to this which I think
we’re trying to grapple with. 
˘osi : I have a comment on the NGOs.  I have a feeling that
NGOs are much more active than just collecting information.
What are their rules and objectives? How they are function-
ing? What is the source of their budget? Who is responsible
for formulating their mission goals?  I would like to read just
one of the definitions of an NGO, which seems completely
different than what they are actually doing on the ground.
“NGOs are the institutional expression of civil society. They
are non-profit organizations, long-established and well-fund-
ed, or short lived for a single purpose. Just a few additional
sentences. There are 32,000 NGOs from the developed
nations, 80,000 within affected nations, and the budgets for
all of them totals 100 million. What is the source of their
budgets? Disaster relief, food and agricultural activities..this I
can see.  But activities meant to encourage democratic
processes? Initiating a process is an active role. This is not




























ment. NGOs are a very interesting issue, and I agree that
they are much more like Intelligence organizations. They
have reliable information, gather prime information on site,
and so forth.
Kerr: I think it is going to be harder and harder for Intelligence
to focus on the problems of greatest priority to U.S. policy.  It
is too easy to be diverted by current issues that may be rela-
tively unimportant in the scheme of things, but which get pub-
licity. A one liner on the news that catches people’s attention,
or a photograph of some dramatic incident, may drive both
Intelligence and the policy maker.  Intelligence cannot shape
the issues that it wants to address. 
Dedijer: Bill Colby initiated a national Intelligence debate about
what is important at this moment for the U.S. to deal with.
You’ve got that.
Kerr: No, no. We always have statements of priority in one form
or another, but it is not clear who pays attention to them, and
they are easily crowded out by current issues. 
Doder: What is important to understand about television is that
it’s picture driven. In other words, first they acquire pictures
and then you put in the text and the picture dictates what the
text is.  Irrespective of what’s happening. 
Something else on NGOs. I can see why any government that
is not established is afraid of NGOs, and also of journalists.
You know when I was in Moscow in the 1980’s, the journal-
ists were regarded as spies and you saw us as spies.
Shebarshin: I didn’t.
Doder: I really don’t think so.
Shebarshin: Why not?
Doder: What has happened in several instances is that people
then get so radicalized that they get into different kinds of
warcraft, but I don’t think that American papers would
employ journalists connected to the CIA.  
Shebarshin: The role of the media, in particular television, is
very cleverly illustrated in a De Niro film, “Wag the Dog”.  I
advise you all to see it. 
Jackovich: I feel we’re getting deeper into a media-related sub-
ject, which is good if that is a productive direction, but we
might be getting off the subject. 
Smith: I don’t think it’s a productive subject. It’s part of life, one
has to deal with it. We have to deal with it, politicians have
to deal with it, policymakers have to deal with it.  But televi-
sion is rarely very informative, very often it’s misleading, and



























impotant issues are, whether they like it or not and whether
the policymakers like it or not. Now clearly, some other peo-
ple have to answer the policymaker’s questions in regard to
what they see on television. That has to be responded to . 
Kerr: I agree with one exception. Intelligence officers want to do
things the way they want. They expect policymakers to read
their product. But whether you like it or not, more and more
policymakers are used to sitting in front of the Internet. They
are used to being on e-mail. They are used to getting quick
responses to their questions. They are going to want infor-
mation in a different form, so if Intelligence is clever, it’s
going to have to figure how to influence the policymakers as
they are, not as we wish them to be.
When I used be an analyst, there was a certain arrogance
about analysts who would try to tell a policymaker about an
individual that lives 3000 miles away, a person from another
culture, someone he even doesn’t fully understand, and
whose language he probably doesn’t speak, and yet he can’t
even figure out how the policymaker sitting right in front of
him thinks and feels. I’m off the subject, obviously.
Smith: But you’re right. We have to do what the policymaker
wants. We have to feed the policymaker material we want to
feed him in a form which he would find digestable and which
makes sense to him. There is no doubt about that. We can’t
say “no no, that’s not what you want, here is what you want.”
Jackovich: There is a subject that came up earlier in regard to
international operations, operations where the international
community has agreed in one form or another to be present
on the ground, and to take action or to do some peace-
keeping or peace maintaining. Bosnia comes to mind,
Kosovo comes to mind easily, but there are other places as
well. What I would like to do in the short time remaining is to
talk about successful operations or quandaries, challenges or
problems which developed in terms of how Intelligence is
provided to these operations, either in a national way, from
one particular national service to the operation, or in a mul-
tilateral form. If we could just return to that particular ques-
tion which we addressed earlier.  Would somebody like to
speak to this?
Doder: This touches on a problem we dealt with in the morning;
that is, how the political world, great powers, and the mem-
bers of the Security Council reach an agreement to imple-
ment a certain decision. I pointed out that we have no agree-
ment in the Balkans between the four Western powers,
France, Germany, the United States and Britain. If you don’t
have an agreement on a political level, you let the UN han-



























UN as incompetent, lazy, and gutless. I don’t know who said
that if your commander has clear cut decisions and knows
where he is going, then everything functions. Here we don’t
know where it’s going, the United Nations is taking care of it,
and we create countries, say in Bosnia, with money.  This only
encourages a sense of dependency.  I remember Sarajevo
just after Dayton; the street was full of garbage. I said to peo-
ple, “why don’t you burn this goddamn pile of garbage.”
One guy says “we’re waiting for Italian trucks; they’re com-
ing any day and then we’re going to remove it.” You create
such a dependency on international donors, who actually
resent this. I’ll tell you another thing about this NGO’s which
has just occurred to me. 
I was a fellow at the U.S. Institute for Peace.  The Institute
gives grants to NGOs to promote conflict resolution.
Distinguished figures, former ambassadors, and cabinet
members sit on the Institute’s board. They invited me to sit in
on their meeting.  They had given a grant of $150,000 and
the groups were back now to report on their mission to
develop brotherhood between the Muslims and the Croats in
Livno. So in come two guys in nice, clean shirts and the books
are presented with charts, and everything is in color, and I
look through their expenditures, and see that they have two
Jeep Cherokees. In other words, the expenditures that went
into the infrustructure of this project exceeded the expendi-
tures that were allocated for their project.  For example, they
considered part of the project to put in a heating system for
the Livno high school, which supposedly did not have a stove.
I have covered almost all the Communist countries, and the
Communists always built good schools. There was always a
stove. But let us assume the town of Livno, which is a very
cold town in winter, didn’t have stoves.  Wouldn’t the parents
of these kids, 40 years ago, 50 years ago, get a stove, cut up
the firewood?  I mean, these are their children.  So they
looked at us and said, “well, maybe there was a stove, but we
want to upgrade everything.” Sarajevo is now full of people
like this, actually driving around doing something, looking
very busy, and probably in the process of doing some good.
The question is the price. The price that we pay doesn’t cor-
respond to the results.  And the funniest part is that the board
didn’t like to hear this, because they all felt good about hav-
ing given the money.  They actually want to give money to
promote friendship between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia.
When you tell them that maybe this was not such a brilliant
project, then you feel like you’re pissing on the parade, and
you don’t do that.


























Doder: No, I like them. But they are very expensive.
Tu man: 60% of the expenses for humanitarian organizations in
Croatia go for the people, for their salaries.
Doder: But that’s crazy.
Tu man: But that’s a fact.
Kerr: If you want to get back to the principle issue. It seems to
me that from the US perspective, when the US is dealing with
a problem like Bosnia or a situation where U.S. forces are
involved in coalition forces, it would put together a special
task force and, essentially, Intelligence would not be a major
problem. I don’t think the U.S. is going to be a major con-
tributor of Intelligence to an organization where it lacks con-
trol. So I think in the case of U.N., which acts largely inde-
pendently, the U.S. would be very reluctant to do more than
give token support. It will show some help, but unless it is the
principle player, unless it feels it has the leadership role, it’s
going to be very reluctant to provide information on a open
and thorough basis. I think that’s the reality of it and I don’t
see that changing soon. I don’t think it should change that
much, either.  I don’t think there’s going to be globalized
Intelligence, by any means.
Lacoste: Yes, we have a point here.  In today’s world, military
Intelligence is very expensive, because it uses a lot of sophis-
ticated devices that are essentially useful only for combat
actions against “high tech” modern armies, as was the case
when NATO and Soviet forces were preparing for a possible
war.  There was a brilliant demonstration of such a “high
tech” conflict during the Gulf War.  It worked well because the
Iraqi forces had been modelled on the Soviet and Western
modern forces.  We had another demonstration of American
tactics during the Kosovo conflict, but the issue was not real-
ly satisfactory.  In both cases, the political goals were not
achieved:  Saddam Hussein is still the head of Iraq, Milosevic
was not immediately deposed, and the populations were the
real victims; moreover, it is not surpirsing that the Serbian
army suffered practically no casualties.  When for demagog-
ic reasons one announces before initiating a war that no
ground troops will be engaged, the enemy merely has to wait
it out under cover of well-camouflaged and protected shel-
ters.  This is one of the consequences of the ridiculous “zero
dead”, as though the life of one soldier is more precious than
the life of hundreds of civilians.  
I believe this is an  interesting issue to raise when considering
political aspects of future conflicts.  We should take into
account the economical and psychological issues.  War is no
longer between superpowers, between national armies, so



























ably not the best one to use for present and future conflicts.
High tech is not paramount; photographs from space cannot
help understand what happens in the mind of a dictator; even
the best “decrypts” by the NSA fail to understand the projects
or strategy of an enemy.  I observe many discrepancies
between the former world and the actual, contemporary
world.  We developed specific tools for the Cold War, highly
sophisticated systems that are increasingly incapable of
addressing new challenges.  
Kerr:: I would assure the Admiral that it is easier for the United
States to think about new investments in technical collection,
and to try to solve the problem that way, than it is to think
about political solutions to difficult political problems. So it is
easier to spend the money and invest in that than to work out
the real problems. But I will bet you that this is the direction
we will be inclined to go, because that’s a programmatic
decision only involving money. So you can say, for example,
that you want to build a satellite that will take pictures of
something as small as my fingernail and you want to see it all
the time, every moment of the day, 24 hours a day, in all
kinds of weather. That’s very satisfying to the military, because
it gives them a marvelous sense of knowing everything. It
doesn’t have much to do with the problems that we are going
to face, I agree, but I think that is the solution we’ll follow.
Agrell: I would like to go back to the UNPROFOR. The UNPRO-
FOR operation was basically a coalition without a clear goal,
without a unified command, and  without any qualified
Intelligence support. The latter was a disaster. The combina-
tion of lack of Intelligence support and lack of unified com-
mand is one of the best recipes for military and political dis-
aster that you could ever prescribe. Why? Why was there no
qualified Intelligence support? Certainly there was a lot of
information available and a lot of Intelligence assets around,
but it didn’t work, because there was this loose coalition of
various countries contributing their forces on a national basis.
They contributed some lowgrade information to the
Intelligence system of the UNPROFOR; basically, military
maps and handbooks of Yugoslav weapon systems. I have
seen some of these things, and they were not very useful for
the force operations. It was not quality Intelligence support,
and of course this was not given because security was not
guaranteed. If UNPROFOR had been provided with quality
Intelligence, there was the risk that it could have been leaked
to those who were not supposed to have access, and thus
sources would have been compromised.  Now the European



























management, which would end up with 250,000 men, but
with no Intelligence structure. There we have a big problem,
at least as Europeans, because we might end up revisiting
UNPROFOR.
Tu man:: But there will always that problem, because if you
don’t have a clear objective, there is no chance of getting the
Intelligence.
Agrell: You must have an objective, you must have a unified
command, and then you have a chance of getting
Intelligence support.
Tu man: This afternoon we discussed the fact that there is no
clear objective, and that  there is no precise wish to solve the
problem on the ground. 
Dedijer:: Miro, can I ask you a question? How do you explain
that the European Union doesn’t work at all with
Intelligence? They want to invest tremendous amounts of
money without using Intelligence.  It’s crazy.
Agrell: There is a very strong national hangup on Intelligence.
You can hand over sovereignty to the Union in many fields,
but not in the field of Intelligence. That is the last field where
you hand over anything.
Lacoste: Not unless you accept having shared Intelligence in
certain sectors. It is done, though not very well, in criminal
investigations, which are low level but can be effective, even
in drug investigations. We have positive examples of such
task forces.
Kerr: But don’t you think that Europeans also are and have been
very unwilling to invest in the infrastructure needed to do this?
You just don’t say  “I’m going to have Intelligence systems
and I’m going to have a comprehensive view of the world
through all the technical means available.”  After all, the
United States started building a huge intelligence system at
the beginning of the Cold War. It is a huge industry and a vast
investment and operation. Even if you have the technical
means, even if the Europeans have the satellites to put up,
they couldn’t interpret them, they couldn’t read them or fig-
ure out what to do with the information.  This is not just a
casual business. The United States, in my view, is in the wrong
business for the future. But that is the business we have been
in, so that is what we know how to deal with.  Remember the
old joke about the drunk looking under a street light for his
keys? Someone asks him “Is that where you lost them?” and
he says,  “No, but this is where the light is”. That is what we
are used to doing. Whether we’ll do it effectively in the future




























Jackovich: I think the topics tomorrow are going to be fascinat-
ing. The possibilities and limitations, what can and cannot be
done, and also ethics and legal norms. We got into this a lit-
tle bit; in fact, Admiral Lacoste got us into the question of
organized crime and its connection with the Intelligence serv-
ices, which I think will be a fascinating discussion under one
of tomorrow’s topics. I will not attempt to sum up what we
said in a rather broad-ranging discussion, whether you look
at this as pessimism, cynicism, realism, or simply, as Mr.
Shebarshin said, the hard nosed reality of the business. It’s
either in the national interest or it is not in the national inter-
est. It is probably not in the national interest to go into broad-
er information-sharing where it cannot be protected and may
not be used properly in the national interest. At the same
time, we have an environment where there is proliferation in
the information field, and a multitude of new players. The
proliferation is not represented just by players like the NGOs,
which have their own services, politics, and self-designated
role to play, but also by television and its impact on the pub-
lic and policymakers.  Then you have the immediacy of com-
munication through the Internet and people’s access to a
broader public dialogue. So we have the reality of national
interests of the Intelligence services versus a world in which
there are many more players and an explosion of information
capabilities. Would anyone else like to comment? 
Lacoste: Just a point maybe. We know that if you want to play
a role in the world, not just against others, but as real play-
ers, you need to have the Intelligence capacity. In my own
country, that has been disregarded by politicians for years
and years.  It began only after the Cold War, when there was
a lack of real information. So we tried to develop a satellite
capacity, not just for collection, but also for interpretation.
You know there is a European service near Madrid that we
share with the Spaniards and Italians. We had another proj-
ect with Germany - a radar satellite - but that project failed
because they didn’t put the money into it, and we got to the
same point as we did before. I think now everyone agrees
there is a necessity for this. 
Dedijer:In closing, I woujld like to talk a bit about the lack of
individual and political intelligence in conflict resolution in
the former Yugoslavia, and the stupidity and corruption in
Yugoslav conflict resolution by the representatives of the
European Union, the United Nations, and, to some extent,
the U.S. My political approach to the problem of former
Yugoslavia is very simple: I am a Serb and I know from expe-
rience in the U.S., Sweden, and other democratic countries


























and Bosnians are free. That is why I have opposed the
Milosevic regime since he came into power in l988, and
launched four wars against Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Kosovo in order to achieve the goal of “Great Serbia”.  I
watched in horror from l991 to l995 as, among others, John
Major, Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, Lord David Owen,
former prime minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt, Francois
Mitterand, Bill Clinton, and Al Gore proclaimed the Milosevic
aggressions in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo »civil wars«, and
urged the democratic countries to remain neutral. On July 4,
l995, I published an article in Dagens Nyhetter in Stockholm,
»Send Thousands of Bombers to Serbia”, which NATO finally
did in l999, thus bringing the criminal Milosevic regime to an
end. I was further shocked to read the following in Lord
Owen’s 1996 book: »I told Milosevic that he would not get
a Great Serbia, but he would get a greater Serbia.« The UN
representative in Bosnia, Carl Bildt, spoke of Milosevic in his
book as the only Balkan leader with whom one could discuss
problems, and condemned the presidents of Croatia,
Tudjman, and Bosnia, Izetbegovic, as unreasonable men. It
was incomprehensible to me that the Dayton Agreement
established »Republika Srpska« in Eastern Bosnia, run by the
very Serbs who had established the heinous concentration
camps that repelled the world, and who were responsible for
the butchery in Srebrenica, where several thousand Croats
and Muslims were killed. It is thus not surprising that, after the
signing of the Dayton Agreement, the representative of
Republika Srpska, Koljevic, said on CNN: »Now we have
achieved Great Serbia«.  Soon after Dayton, when the Labour
Party came to power in Britain, it was revealed that the
Milosevic government utilized the National Westminster Bank,
which is headed by Major’s former foreign minister, Douglas
Hurd. (Hurd, Bildt, and Kissinger are consultants to the
Hucklyt Company, founded by FitzRoy MacLean in l996 to
provide intelligence for corporations and governments in
business, now run by former MI6 officials. See Financial
Times of March 23, 2000). My guess is that after Milosevic is
overthrown from power and tried for his crimes, many former
European ministers and prime ministers may be found to





























Subjects and methods of Intelligence agencies 
at the beginning of 21st century: 
possibilities and limits
National vs. non-national Intelligence collection; cover vs.
overt collection of information; bilateral and multilateral cooper-
ation; Intelligence for international, national and private organi-
zations; etc.
Moderators:  Richard Kerr, W. Agrell
Kerr: The subject is the nature and methods of Intelligence. Let
me start just with my perception of the changes. I think the
Intelligence during the Cold War was extremely important to
the major issues in the East-West confrontation. Intelligence
owned the information to a considerable degree; it owned
the satellites and the communications intercepts. It had the
clandestine networks it had built, it owned those instruments
that process the information, and it also owned the reporting
mechanisms by which that information was reported to the
policymakers. So it was actually a closed shop. There were a
few people outside who thought they had inside information,
and they certainly did on politics, but on issues of strategic
military forces of the major issues that threatened the survival
of the countries involved, Intelligence did own and control
that information. With the end of the Cold War, the threat to
national survival of the countries became a less critical issue,
and the kind of information that was needed for policy devel-
opment began to spread out. More and more people knew
more and more about the issues of interest to the policymak-
ers. So Intelligence no longer owns the business of informa-
tion; it is merely one of its many players. I think that changes
in a very fundamental way the nature of the role of
Intelligence. There are still a few areas where Intelligence
plays a critical role, so I don’t think one should say that there
is no need for secret information. Terrorism is a good exam-
ple. Nuclear proliferation is a good example, and also nar-
cotics.  I think though that criminal activities will in time tend
to move into the law inforcement area. I think that’s one of


























the defense establishment. For thirty years, forty years, the
U.S. military forces never directly engaged, to my knowledge,
the principle adversary, the Soviet Union. They never rubbed
up directly against that force. It was all conducted through
other parties. Other countries fought each other in the name
of the East and West; the U.S. military was primarily a strate-
gic force prepared to deal with the strategic, larger battle, but
it really didn’t engage.  It trained other people and provided
equipment.  But within the last 10 or 15 years, beginning with
Granada, and since then Panama, the U.S. military has
become, in effect, a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy,
whether you like it or not.  I personally don’t like it, but
Intelligence has been a main supporter of that military activ-
ity. There’s now less strategic Intelligence and much more
tactical Intelligence. The other major change that I would
suggest is that law enforcement has become a much more
critical ingredient in the international scene than it was dur-
ing the Cold War. The FBI is everywhere now.  The FBI coop-
erates widely with other countries in law enforcement. The
Drug enforcement agency in the U.S. works with other organ-
izations, and it is no longer the exclusive business of
Intelligence to conduct liaison and foreign liaison. So I would
say that changes the very fundamental nature of the role of
Intelligence, and also the role of other sources and other
information.
Agrell: I think you put your finger on something very important.
What we have witnessed in the last 10 years is not a really a
change of Intelligence structures as such, but a change in the
environment, a change in the questions being asked. The
questions that were central for the last 40 years are still pres-
ent to some extent, but they are not that crucial anymore.
There is a whole set of questions that the old system simply
can’t handle, because it’s not constructed for it. There are
other aspects of these changes, however, because of the
objects the Intelligence structures are monitoring and analyz-
ing. The world is also changing, and the technical premises
for Intelligence collection are changing, and here are themes
I think we should discuss.  The first is the information tech-
nology revolution. “Information Overkill” is a term invented
in the early 1970’s in the U.S., describing a situation where
one has access to much more raw information than one can
ever use or need.  In fact, one has more than one wants.  In
the 60’s, 70’s and 80’s, this overload of information was a
problem for the Intelligence agencies. Today we are all suf-
fering from information overkill through the Internet. What
does information technology revolution mean in terms of
Intelligence?  Is it solving problems or is it creating new ones?44
Another question is that of overt and secret Intelligence col-
lection. Mr. Dedijer has been kind enough to leave an article
here called “Spies”. It claims that spying is not dying, but
already stone dead, and that spying is a Cold War hangup,
immoral and dangerous. Technology has outmatched spying
and open sources provide better information than spies.
Machines provide better Intelligence than humans. 
Dedijer: It’s by Professor Johnson of the University of Georgia,
who has written three books on the CIA. 
Agrell: I’m not sure he’s right, and I’m being very diplomatic.
The information technology revolution not only provides new
open sources enabling us go to our computer, log in, search
for information and receive the answers we need.  It also pro-
vides new means for secret Intelligence collection, especially
in electronic communications. There’s e-mail, and also eco-
nomic transaction systems that the global economy is more
and more dependent upon. This is a new, weak spot in the
system, and also a potential source for secret Intelligence col-
lection, not only by agencies and institutions, but by other
entities as well. The last question, which coincides with what
Richard said, is: who is supposed to solve this more difficult
task, who can do it?  Can an Intelligence agency do it alone
or is it too complex to be handled by an institution? Will we
see Intelligence analysis task forces in the future which will be
used for specific purposes, in the same way as peace
enforcement task forces? 
Dedijer: I think it was a very good opening. I’m not a profes-
sional in Intelligence, but I was a member of the Communist
party for 22 years, which was very good training for
Intelligence. My experience is limited, but I’ve been studying
Intelligence.  When I left Yugoslavia I asked myself what was
wrong with Tito and the whole Yugoslav elite. They didn’t
understand which way the world was going, and to under-
stand where the world is heading, you need Intelligence.
Everybody speaks about revolutions. Bill Gates of Microsoft
represents the computer revolution. There is a revolution in
everything. Since 1945, several colonial empires have disap-
peared. Two hundred new states have arisen, and one is frag-
menting; namely, England. The conservative parties are ask-
ing where England is now.  Scotland is breaking away, as is
Ireland. There are dozens of revolutions going on: political,
scientific, ecological, and so forth, and to understand the
need for Intelligence, you must understand what revolution
means.  What is happening in the Intelligence communities?
They are falling apart. They have no lasting goal. And nowa-



























Leonov: The topic of covert versus overt collection of informa-
tion is another subject that requires special attention.  I dare-
say that the proportion between the two is changing in favor
of  overt information. In the major, democratic countries, the
number of policymakers participating in the formulation of
foreign policy is growing continously. Among them are polit-
ical parties, Congress and Parliamentary groups, research
centers, influential mass media, prominent personalities, and
so on. Kissinger, Brzezinski, and Albright came to politics
from the universities. Their basic approach to major interna-
tional problems is well known. In fact, their behavior could
often be predicted in advance. Second, the mass media are
always searching for their own secret sources of information,
but as soon as sensitive information falls in the hands of the
newspapermen, this information becomes accessible to
everyone.  For instance, we obtained the first information
about the United States’ secret plan to rescue the men from
the sunken Soviet submarine in the Pacific through California
newspapers. The number of professional analysts who are
utilizing public information is also growing, but in the process
of analysis, they often enrich these data, draw conclusions,
and make prognoses, which is valuable. 
During the past decade, the Internet has become a crucial
instrument if information support. In the coming century, its
importance will increase even more.  Personal electronic
devices are less expensive, quicker, and provide more reliable
information; that is, as opposed to misinformation often pre-
pared for counterintelligence purposes.  But  I would like to
conclude by saying that I believe the human factor will remain
essential in the Intelligence world.
Boyadjiev: I agree entirely with Mr. Agrell about the new possi-
bilities for Intelligence gathering with the development and
technical progress in the field of information and communi-
cation technologies and so on. The new trend here is that the
number of experts able to do this is increasing tremendously.
Not only Intelligence agencies and private companies can
gather sensitive information, but now many individuals have
the chance to obtain secret information just by surfing the Net
through international communication networks. I’ll give you
an example. For the last several years, I’ve often been aston-
ished while surfing the Web to find information that is con-
sidered to be secret, or at least confidential. Just one exam-
ple: on a Russian server I found a handbook for terrorists and
anarchists, with detailed formulas and manuals on how to
make a chemical bomb, binary weapons, and other modern
means of destruction, not to mention Molotov cocktails and



























on the Internet astonishes me. I recall a Bulgarian proverb
that says that there is no good without evil. In this case, the
good comes with a lot of evil. Here I see an objective which
must be immediately included in the objectives of the secret
services. Another example of the urgency of this issue is the
case of the computer virus “Lovebug”. Several months ago,
the Lovebug, which began somewhere in the Philippines,
attacked major American companies. That was nothing, that
was a child’s play in comparison to what can be done over
the Internet and other communication networks. Every
American battalion now in Kosovo or any other place in the
world receives secret information through INTELLINK, INTEL-
NET, and similar nets. Even though there is a very high level
of security on these nets, they are not 100% secure. If even
they are vulnerable, then imagine the lack of security on more
common nets, where economic information is constantly
flowing. Vital information affecting the lives of people all over
the world, and not only in the States, can be attacked.
Without much difficulty, an aggressive force can deliver a
severe blow. The world economy can be placed in jeopardy,
as well as other areas affecting not just a single country or
state.  Civilization itself can be endangered.  That is why
Wilhelm’s remark was very appropriate. Here I see some-
thing that does not concern only national interests, but some-
thing which ought to become a common denominator in the
cooperation of the different Intelligence services. It affects  the
interests of  a wide variety of countries.
Tu man: In one of Plato’s dialogues, somebody came to
Socrates  telling him that King Kadmo had invented the
alphabet and that now everything would be remembered,
and all knowledge would be at one’s disposal. Socrates had
a different opinion. He claimed that many things would be
forgotten, because they will be in books and not in our heads,
and that is not real knowledge. I agree with most of you that
we are faced with a lot of changes. The information technol-
ogy revolution is also going to change the nature of knowl-
edge. Until recent  times, knowledge in a philosophical sense
was something that could not be separated from the knower,
from the one who did the contemplating. Now we deal with
information as physical evidence, and equate that with
knowledge. But information is independent, not only from the
knower. It is separate from motives and objectives. That is
really what we are looking for: motives and objectives. That
is why we have to take into account that the nature of infor-
mation and knowledge has changed. We have to confront
those changes. First we have changes on a national level,


























ernmental  and oriented to protect national objectives. Now
we have many more actors and objectives which must be pro-
tected:  governmental, non-governmental, and so on. Also,
technology is changing the methods and procedures used to
satisfy those objectives. But I also believe that the gap
between Intelligence and knowledge will grow. Intelligence is
a certain type of knowledge. Intelligence itself is related to
objectives, to the predicting of future events, and supporting
decision-makers. But I am not convinced that this enormous
amount of information will immediately enlighten people
about where they are going and what they want. Also, it’s not
a good idea to believe that everything is changing. Basic
human nature is not changing, because otherwise we lose
our human identity. These tremendous  changes will not pre-
vent us from understanding or reading Shakespeare or listen-
ing to Beethoven or enjoying the works of Michelangelo. That
means something must be and is constant. Or to use anoth-
er example: in spite of all the knowledge and information
available about the reasons, objectives, and nature of the
Israeli- Palestinian conflict, the conflict in Ireland, or the ten-
year conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the conflicts have
not been resolved. Something is still constant; human nature
is not perfect and changes slowly, if at all.  What I believe is
that the environment and methodology are changing, but the
actors and their problems remain constant. At the end of the
twentieth century, we are talking a lot about globalization. But
I believe the process is as old as civilization itself. The Roman
Empire was the global solution for its time. The impact of the
discovery of America was just as important as satellite com-
munictions in the global age. Of course we have to respect
circumstance and the dynamics of events.  We have to be
much more critical and less enthusiastic in our claims that
everything is changing. Things are not the same as before,
but we must not lose our identity if we want to survive.
˘osi : What are the opportunities and challenges of the infor-
mation age and information technologies in the training and
education of the Intelligence community? There is no doubt
that conventional approaches to the education, training, and
thinking in the Intelligence community must be updated and
redesigned. What are the main differences in Intelligence in
the information age compared with Intelligence in the non-
information age? How can Intelligence function effectively
when confronted with the flow of massive information?
Instead of a lack of information in the past, in the information
age, Intelligence sources and channels are now overloaded
with information. Intelligence information comes in many dif-



























we have too much information at our disposal to make deci-
sions. Therefore, new techniques and new formulas must be
devised regarding the information collection, data correla-
tion, and culling of data. The education of the Intelligence
community in the information age requires the introduction of
new curricula in information, computer, and communication
sciences. Information warfare, cyber-war, computer sabo-
tage, and computer espionage are the result of the expansion
of information technologies. Information can even be a
weapon for mass destruction. In cyber- space, new types of
non-state actors may emerge, threatening the existing inter-
national order and stability. How can cyber attacks be uncov-
ered and prevented? A new theoretical connection between
information overflow and decision-making processes must be
established. How can a decision be made when there is an
excess of information and too little time? Artificial Intelligence
and filtering systems then become very important. A new kind
of technical expertise must be developed to support the
Intelligence community in the information age. Strategic con-
sulting is impossible in the information age without reliable
strategic Intelligence. Security and business Intelligence on a
global, regional, or local level needs strategic Intelligence
advice, which is impossible without the additional education
and training of the Intelligence community.
W olf: I agree it’s necessary to discuss the kinds of issues you
addressed in your statement. Naturally the question of infor-
mation plays a big role because changes in technology, and
how it is used, have been greatest during the last decades.
But I think when we discuss the subject of Intelligence in this
new century, about the ethics and legal norms, we can’t
avoid the question of whom the Intelligence services serve
and to advance which goal. In reference to this, I see no prin-
ciple difference between this and the past century. We dis-
cussed a bit yesterday how it’s impossible to separate the use
of the Intelligence service from policy.  So I see only the big
difference that, instead of a balance of power, we now have
a more unilateral use of power, and more judgement calls on
the actions of political forces, organizations, and individuals.
We had that after the Second World War, examples of the use
of policy and power from both sides. The services most prob-
ably served the Government successfully and gave them
information about the threat from the other side, their
weapons, and so on. The result was this very terrible arms
race, and at the end of the ‘70s and the beginning of the
‘80s, the stationing of missiles on both sides.  Of course the
services had to give information, real information, and partly


























on both sides, inside the Governments, among public opin-
ion, and in our own work as well.  This was one reason for
the big crises in the latter half of the last century. I see no real
change in this situation. 
Services, of course, are used by their governments; they’re
serving the nation, and do it perhaps more objectively now.
This is the question we are discussing, and the last example
from the last century, I think, is the intervention in Kosovo. It
was a question of the use of power, but the information, and
the information on public opinion, was one sided.  I felt this
very strongly in Germany, and we observed clearly the
change from a bilateral to a unilateral balance of power.
After the unification of Germany, it seemed incredible that
German armed forces could have taken part in the war.
Before the changes in Europe, and prior to the unification,
this could never have taken place. The question is not
whether this was good or bad, but I just want to say that we
can’t discuss the use of information as an abstact issue as it
relates to every service. The Intelligence service is acting in
the service of a nation, but not the whole nation.  It serves a
government. You see, the difference is a question of policy.
We have now the situation that the presence of troops,
American troops, in Kosovo is a not a objective necessity,
because other candidates for president, George W. Bush, for
example, has said he would like to remove the American sol-
diers. So the connection between real policy, the task at
hand, and the priorities of the services is very close. 
The main question is, in my opinion, whether the policy of the
state and therefore the aims of the Intelligence services
helped to prevent or produced new international crises.  The
past century has provided many such examples, and we can
see in practice the difficulties in fulfilling international agree-
ments regarding, for instance, aerial observation. There were
some international conventions on this.  This is the problem
for the services:  How to fulfill international obligations?
Where is the biggest threat? Does it come from these rogue
states like Libya or North Korea? Current events in North
Korea show how policies change without clear reasons. Of
course, there were some changes, but not substantial enough
to justify Madame Albright’s shaking hands with the “biggest
bandit” in North Korea.  Up to now, I have been unable to
obtain a visa for the United States because of  my “participa-
tion in terrorism”.  Our only participation was contact with the
Palestinians, but Arafat has shaken hands with Clinton on the
lawn of the White House. I would just like to stress the fact
that there is a close connection between political ideas,



























Intelligence work. Another example: what is the arms lobby
doing in the highly developed countries? Perhaps this is more
dangerous and a greater threat than the weapons in second-
ary countries. The former number two man in NATO, the
German General Klaus Neumann, had a lecture in
Switzerland in March, and gave the example of bacteriologi-
cal weapons. How dangerous are they? In Iraq, after the war,
8000 litres of anthrax were found.  One hundred litres could
destroy a city like Lucerne.  I agree with all you have said
about information. There’s a big stream of information going
to the services. Who uses it? How should it be used? My per-
sonal opinion is that for a successful service, human
Intelligence will retain the main role in the future. You may
have reached a different conclusion. My personal opinion is
that it’s possible to reduce the staff of the Intelligence servic-
es, and reduce it very radically, because there is no law which
dictates that all the secret information and information com-
ing from various sources must be collected and analysed only
by the classic services. What may be most important are the
ways of managing this huge stream of information. I believe
the sense and raison d’etre of the services is to collect real,
secret information; not about the actual situation, but about
intentions, and potential threats coming from a real, poten-
tial enemy. Now information is often the continuation of the
policy of power in the absence of a real threat.  But if you
have to know the real plans of a real enemy, you must have
human sources and others kinds of secret information. I
agree that it’s very difficult to categorize them into what’s
more or less urgent, less important… we need a new kind of
education, but it’s still an issue..
Stolz: I would like to come back to Markus’s thing on reducing
the size of the human Intelligence collectors . I agree, but I
think it’s important to deal with Stevan’s cosmic views. He
has elucidated the issues, but I submit that Intelligence offi-
cers are not futurists. For example, we can see trends right
now. One of the things that I find extremely interesting is that
when I was a lad at the university, we were taught that the
nineteenth century was a century of nationalism and that the
twentieth century, by God, was international. What do we see
today? We see devolution in its mildest form - Scotland,
Wales, and the United States. Recent court decisions are
favoring states as opposed to the federal government. And of
course you have the violence in Chechnya, India, Pakistan,
and Yugoslavia. It is different. I don’t pretend to know quite



























we overlooked is the population. Isn’t it six billion? We know
the kind of problems that will create, and we also also think
of it as one solution to overpopulation. Another issue is the
rich-poor - some call it the North-South – issue.
Shebarshin: Abstract global problems, like the future of human-
ity and so on, hardly require secret, Intelligence information.
Real life people, politicians, government officials, and busi-
nessmen may occasionally indulge themselves in discussions
on these matters, but what they need is down-to-earth, prac-
tical information, practical conclusions and suggestions. I
had to work with the government institutions of my country,
and in later years with the Russian Business Corporation.  The
demand for specific, usable data is incomparably greater
than for global predictions and conclusions.  The mission of
Intelligence is to uncover what is concealed from the public
eye, and supply its clients with reliable and useful informa-
tion. 
Lacoste: Yes, I fully agree with what you said. It was my inten-
tion to develop the same arguments.  You were right to insist
upon the difference between “information” and “knowledge”.
I will recall that, traditionally, French military Intelligence had
two sides. We call the first one “documentary Intelligence”,
which is the best possible knowledge of the capacities, doc-
trine, and intentions of the enemy army; its assets, weakness-
es, and so on. The second is “operational Intelligence”,
which is directly connected to the cause of the action and the
operational choices of the authority in charge.  The decision
maker needs both knowledge and information; knowledge to
understand what Intelligence issues mean in order to make
the correct decisions.  
There is another issue that has not really been raised here
concerning the economic revolution.  We have in mind the
political and military aspects of the Balkan problems, but we
should also pay attention to the economic issues.  The shift
from a bipolar strategic situation to a multipolar one has cor-
responding consequences for the global economy.
Nowadays, large international corporations are more con-
cerned with foreign affairs than many governments used to
be.  Their staffs conduct themselves like state governments,
but under the pressure of huge financial and industrial inter-
ests they are taking full advantage of the new tools and the
best products of the age of “information technology”.  I have
observed in my country that no state administration, no politi-
cian, no secret service profits as well as the private sector
from Intelligence assets. Private firms discovered the leverage
effects of Intelligence collection through modern devices,



























dures, and “knowledge management”.  I believe it is very
important for government administrations and traditional
Intelligence agencies to adopt new methods of managing
information.  Large international corporations represent an
interesting model, because their leaders are excellent man-
agers and strategists.  They are actually and efficiently con-
trolled by their shareholders, who carefully monitor their
financial performances.  It is not the same for politicians.
They are supposed to be controlled by the votes of the citi-
zens, whose appreciation is based on other criteria. 
Another analogy between the state and private sectors is the
development of electronic networks inside governmental sys-
tems and military systems.  Traditionally, administrations and
military structures are organized as a pyramid; orders go
from top to bottom, and reports from bottom to top.  Today,
in the real economic world, management is based more and
more upon various interconnected networks.  The psycholog-
ical effects are important for human relations inside and out-
side the organization.  The traditional, bureaucratic model is
no longer able to manage collective knowledge as well as
modern methods, which use new information technologies
and software assets.
This is a big challenge also for Intelligence agencies and the
relations they have with their governments.  There is a “revo-
lution in military affairs” that takes into account these ele-
ments; for example, at the operational and tactical levels,
where they actually mix command, control, and Intelligence
information in fully integrated networks. It is a new dimen-
sion, and the private sector applies it more rapidly than pub-
lic administration.
Agrell: If large corporations are starting to behave like govern-
ments, then there will be legal problems, and we need to dis-
cuss the ethical and legal aspects of Intelligence this after-
noon. It’s a considerable problem. One week ago, the large
Swedish multinational corporation, Ericsson, got into hot
water because the Swedish paper revealed that it had paid
around 170 million Swedish crowns through its intermedi-
aries to consultants, who did not want their identities known.
We can imagine what those consultants were doing. These
are facts of life for big business in the world of globalization:
the use of Intelligence, bribes, and use of connections neces-
sary to close almost all big contracts.  This also characterizes
real business Intelligence; that is, Intelligence not obtained
through the Internet or open media sources, and which pro-
vides a general view of the customer or country with which



























is identifying the central figures, getting to know them, and
making contact with them so that you can close the deal with
the assistance of key persons. This illustrates the continuing
importance of clandestine Intelligence work. 
Lacoste: Another analogy is the spreading of networks in gov-
ernment and military systems. It is a part of what I would call
collective knowledge versus individual knowledge. 
Doder: I’m listening to this and I actually have no knowledge
about the bureaucratic side of Intelligence, but I do know
something about information and what to do with informa-
tion. In the end it seems to me that the purpose of any
Intelligence organization is not only to provide information to
policymakers but to tell them what this information means.
Despite globalization and the profusion of information, it
seems to me that need for solid Intelligence services is greater
now than before, because we face entirely new types of chal-
lenges ranging from narcotics trade and international terror-
ism to cyberspace crime and weapons of mass destruction
being acquired by rogue states. It’s a very specific kind of
Intelligence, because it requires experience and a certain
kind of knowledge. I’m told that actually today, it’s very dif-
ficult to bug, because these are these obstacle cables that
transmit millions of messages and it’s very hard to locate
who’s saying what and from where. It’s an enormous task.
This is what one of the operators told me. It seems to me that
Intelligence work for a private cooperation is something
entirely different, because in the end, you have a national
service to protect national interests, and provide leaders with
the best possible assessment of potential threats and how to
deal with the countries presenting them. 
Dedijer: After the Cold War, all national intelligence communi-
ties suffered from what I call »mental viruses«, which are sim-
ilar to computer viruses in their destructive capacity. These old
ideas - »idols« as Francis Bacon called them – almost lost me
my life in December in Bastogne, Belgium. In spite of the
good intelligence they possessed, Generals Eisenhower and
Bradley stuck to the mental virus that Hitler could not start a
new offensive. The former CIA director,  Robert Gates,
describes the CIA in his book From the Shadows as »one of
the most closed bureacracies in Washington, an  agency hos-
tile to ‘outsiders’ at any level, a complex and clannish organ-
isation deeply averse to change«. What is true of the CIA in
the most open country, the United States, is true of all other
intelligence agencies. Their reform, even the need for reform,
is now being questioned. We live today in an emerging glob-
al civilization, a »global village« with 6.1 billion inhabitants



























places, regions, and nations - all undergoing multi-dimen-
sional radical changes; that is, revolutions.  It is from this
image of our planet that we must start to look at the »subjects
and methods of intelligence agencies at the beginning of the
21st Century«.
The world today is dominated economically, technologically,
militarily, and in many ways culturally, by the U.S., which has
less than 5% of the world population.  The United States is the
freest and most creative state in the world, but falls behind
socially, as compared to the Scandinavian countries, which
are also free and creative. This domination by the U.S. must
not and will not last.  I believe that the emergence of business
intelligence and security, and the democratization of other
countries, above all China and Russia, will lead to a com-
petitive socialization of the world, and that my dream of a
world without “prisoners of starvation« will be realized by
global democratic capitalism.
Leijonhielm: Just a few reflections as I listen to the debate.
Sometimes I get a feeling that we are discussing the same
topics and the same ambitions, but from a different perspec-
tive. There is, as we know, a tremendous difference between
larger countries’ capabilities in Intelligence as compared to
smaller countries, and my views reflect the smaller country´s.
If you have only 1% of the American Intelligence potential,
you are forced to totally adapt your handling of threats in a
way which larger countries do not. I would like to bring up a
few points from that perspective. There are several trends
which have been mentioned here. One is that HUMINT is not
dying, and spying is not dying, but getting smaller, and this
very much reflects the present situation in Intelligence. The
rapid change in relations between developed nations and
underdeveloped nations totally alters the need for
Intelligence. For example, small countries like Sweden, which
are not threatened militarily – even in the long term - must
concentrate on specific possible threats in order to avoid
information glut, which has been mentioned here. It is impos-
sible to cover all things which might constitute a threat, and
which are better covered by other institutions. I see a majori-
ty of traditional Intelligence tasks going to private security
agencies or or other institutions. Traditional Intelligence tech-
niques are of limited interest in evaluating new types of
threats. Apart from military threats, the new type of threats are
more uncontrollable and unforeseeable and will threaten new
sectors of society - from electricity supplies to social services.
We spoke earlier today about a Swedish hacker who man-
aged to close down Florida’s rescue service for almost two


























mass destruction, because we have found, as we heard ear-
lier, instructions on how to build such weapons on the
Internet. One can find today relatively good instructions on
how to build effective biological weapons in one’s own back-
yard. This type of threat is very real. You also have technical
progress in the conventional explosives sphere, which per-
haps does not seem that important. But consider that today,
it is possible to increase the energy intensity of conventional
explosives by several times. This will enable terrorists to blow
up World Trade Centers much more effectively in the future.
Therefore, a high priority for military Intelligence must be
technical developments and new military technology,
because that is what constitutes the threats, also in the civil-
ian sphere, in the future. 
Kerr: It appears to me that we would generally agree that
Intelligence organizations and Intelligence are going to
remain vital, and that the countries still need to support their
foreign policy.  They need information that is directed at their
problems.  And their problems are more diverse and compli-
cated. Whether it’s secret or open is less relevant than the
fact that they still need information, and are still going to be
faced with an enormous set of complicated problems. I would
argue in some ways that more detail and finer-grained infor-
mation is required. I think Doder was actually making this
point – the world is in some ways more complicated then it
was before. Because the level of detail that’s required is
sometimes greater and the knowledge at a greater level of
sophistication. But if you make that assumption and we go to
some of the other comments made, I would also argue that
if I were a policymaker, I would say there are too many voic-
es out there. There are too many people trying to help me
and I would still need an organization that can give me
coherent, relevent answers to my problems. Not to somebody
else’s problems, but to my problems. Then the question I
would ask is: are the organizations that I have at my dispos-
al good enough to do that? Can I be confident, in this com-
plex world, that an organization can give me unambiguous,
direct, and relevant answers to the questions that I have? I
think there is a way to do that, but I am not convinced that
the Intelligence organization I worked for has done that. I
would argue that during the Cold War, we tried to do every-
thing. We tried to be experts on everything, and built a huge
organization that had great expertise on everything in the




























nomic, political, and social issues. Today, the organizations
have shrunk in size, and are much more focused on current
activities, so it’s impossible for them to deal with this array of
problems at the level of sophistication the policymaker needs. 
Kerr: So we can say, at least from the U.S. perspective,  that
Intelligence organizations can’t be everything to everybody,
so they need to change the way they think about problems.
Analysts should not try to be experts on every problem, but
should try figure out where the expertise lies. Who are the
experts? And how can they obtain the information relevant to
the problems with which they have to deal to support nation-
al policy?  That is quite a different role, and it means locat-
ing areas of expertise, perhaps outside the goverment. In fact,
many of them should be outside the Government, but we
need to know how to use that array for our own particular self
interest. It seems to me that this is the key, and it means
admitting that we don’t know everything. It’s difficult for
Intelligence officers to say “I don’t know much about this
problem; in fact, I don’t know anything, but I’ll find out.” I
would argue that this requires a whole change in the way one
thinks. 
Agrell: I think Richard said something very important here about
the change in the role of Intelligence agencies. In the 1990s,
we saw the birth of a lot of strange new expressions, and one
of them was “information broker”.  An information broker is
a person who helps someone obtain information they cannot
obtain on their own. Maybe what you are hinting at is that the
government needs Intelligence brokers, experts who come in
at the point where knowledge and decision-making intersect.
The methodological problem is that they do not know the
facts, because it’s impossible to know them today.  You can’t
even predict the questions that need to be answered. So this
is a fundamental change not only in the organizational and
source structure, but in the core profession. 
Boyadjiev: First of all I think that with our capable mediators, we
have reached some level of telepathy around the table. We
have started to think about many things that different
Intelligence services have in common. I want to make some
remarks from a very narrow angle. Not from the position of
“We, the services,” but of  “Me, the Spy who was Left Out in
the Cold”. What do I mean by this? 
A lot of Intelligence professionals in ex-Eastern Europe, some
of whom have maintained their former sources, not only with-
in their national borders but in other countries as well, are
now dispersed within society. The majority is focused in pri-
vate business. I mention this because I think special services


























With the end of the Cold War, many terms and categories,
such as “main adversary”, “chief enemy”, and so on, were
discarded. Today, everybody is in competition. Former allies
are competing against each other. Soon their national and
private counterintelligence services are going to face addi-
tional problems presented by “friendly Intelligence” from
Eastern Europe. This will most likely be on a private and not
a state level, but this does not make it any less aggressive. So
now we have not only the issue of global government inter-
ests, but the problem of competing on a private level. 
Here I would like to make a comment about what General
Æosiæ said. He raised the question of educating Intelligence
professionals. I think a majority of the professionals left in the
cold are now doing exactly that - preparing or teaching
young people and specialists from the private field in the craft
of Intelligence. I know that Generals Shebarshin and Leonov
and their colleagues are doing that.  For several years, the
first private, Russian, high-level educational, Institute for
Security of Private Business, has been in operation.
The Bulgarian Euro Atlantic Intelligence Forum – our
Association - has been doing the same thing for more than
eight years. We have a group of nine people, professionals
from Intelligence and counterintelligence, and we teach dif-
ferent aspects of Intelligence in several Bulgarian universities.
So knowledge about the Intelligence craft is becoming known
among wider audiences, and that will be felt in the competi-
tive field of private business. 
Jackovich: We’re touching on something that goes into anoth-
er aspect, and I think Mr. Wolf mentioned this yesterday; that
is, professionalism, the expertise that emerges from particular
services, and what happens with it. I see a potential danger
in terms of it. The infusion of this personnel into society and
the loss to the professional services is one thing.  The poten-
tial gain for some other entities is quite another. Here, I am
thinking in two dimensions.  One is something that Admiral
Lacoste mentioned yesterday, and that is organized crime and
criminality. Assets can be used in a positive way. If, for exam-
ple, in the Soviet Union nuclear physicists and scientists that
were connected with particular laboratories are the benefici-
aries of a program, however meager and modest it, or its
results, might be for the West.  Is it out of the realm to think
that the same thing might be possible in the Intelligence field?
Maybe its not by virtue of the nature of Intelligence work. I
don’t know. But it seems to me there is a danger that, if
something positive is not undertaken, then somebody will
undertake something negative. You already have a situation



























bilities that rival national Intelligence services, which I don’t
think we’ve seen to that extent in the past. You have corrup-
tion and criminality within a state that we tended earlier to
think was part of a transition process. The longer the transi-
tion process goes on and the longer these groups operate in
a transnational, active sense, the greater the danger that it
becomes a permanent phenomenon in these states. Then you
have the social reaction to it. If the people in these states
begin to look upon that sort of development as an integral
part of liberalization and democratization, then support for
liberalization and democratization will weaken among the
populations of those states.  The essence of this is that the
entire economy, entire states can be hijacked in today’s world
by the strength of criminal organizations which are perhaps
the beneficiaries of fallen away Intelligence services.
Leijonhielm: I believe that widespread criminality in transition
countries is here to stay. I think there is ample evidence of
that, and it fits well into Putnam’s theory that, in a state where
constitution building is not taking place, criminal structures
tend to grow rapidly. People’s faith in governmental institu-
tions vanish where unemployment is high and poverty is
spreading, as we see in almost all the transition countries. For
example in Italy, this type of criminality is extremely difficult to
eradicate.  Of course, there are different phases in criminal-
ity. In its earlier phase it is most harmful, because then most
revenues from criminal activity are exported instead of invest-
ed within the country, and capital goods are imported. Later,
when reliance on institutions in the country has grown, the
money will eventually return and be invested in the country.
But now, my impression is that, for example, Russian organ-
ized crime is in its most harmful phase. I would also like to
make a comment on what the chairman said at the begin-
ning. I think we should move one step further in order to be
prepared for new threats. Intelligence agencies must open
up, and more effectively use the knowledge of possible threat
scenarios which exist in open society by creating reference
groups or knowledge centers to focus on specific problems.
Not only should academics and Intelligence people be
involved, but also individuals with vast experience in the tar-
geted area. Devil’s advocates are also needed. This mixture
should eventually lead to a better understanding of  imminent
future threats.
Jackovich: You’re quite right about the export of profits. In the
past, in the United States and elsewhere, things were built in
the places which were producing the money, continuing the



























community, so the communities benefited.  Today, with glob-
alized economy, the profits are going to where they can be
increased, and that means he exports the profits to make
greater profits elsewhere. 
Kerr: In regard to the private sector, I was commenting to
Admiral Lacoste that I watched the banks invest in the
Phillipines in the early 1970’s, as the economy was going
into the pits, and lose literally millions and millions of dollars.
U.S. and foreign business have not been all that clever in
predicting the future. Consider their investment in South East
Asia and the financial collapse there.  So business does not
necessarily have a clarity about the future that we might have
implied. It also makes terrible mistakes even though it has a
single minded focus on making money, whereas Intelligence
does not have such a clear objective.
Doder: Dick was saying how I think in a very polite and diplo-
matic way about Eastern Europe, and the former security
people who were involved in shady business as consultants
and so forth.  The last time I was in Bulgaria, former athletes
and former security people were the local mafia. Car theft
was so prevalent that it was impossible to drive. Then they get
hold of police uniforms and pull drivers over, take the driver
out, and take the car. The Chinese embassy hasn’t had a sin-
gle car stolen. The guys that run the only kind of reliable
parking lot in front of the main hotel are part of the mafia,
too. They charge extortionist prices, but at least your car is
there. 
Boyadjiev: A lot of stolen luxury cars are brought into Bulgaria
through the nets of organized crime networks, even from
Canada. But not only Bulgarians are participating in those
rings.
Doder: But what I’m trying to say is that many of these security
services were extremely large, and then when they were dis-
mantled, a lot of people couldn’t find a job. 
Kerr: A lot of us have become consultants.
Dedijer: In England you have Oxford and Analytica, put togeth-
er by a CIA man who took 800 professors from Cambridge,
Oxford, all the English universities, and organized them as
consultants. You want to know what’s happening in Uganda?
You get three professors and three reports for 50,000 dollars.
Such firms are rising up all over the world, consulting firms
which do the work of other former Intelligence organizations.
Boyadjiev: In Bulgaria, the process started with the establish-
ment of “companies” selling “security”. Most of them were
registered by ex- wrestlers, fighters, kick box specialists, and
so forth. That was a lower form of selling security - with a



























are trying to do, and what General Shebarshin’s Institute is
trying to do, is to teach legitimate managers about company
security; to prepare people with clean dossiers. We are teach-
ing them law, economics, informatics and then, as a second
part during the second year of their education, the special
crafts of Intelligence services. We think that, in this way, we
can help rid society of the false security “retailers” selling their
“security services” through racketeering and force, and place
trustworthy and legitimate people in this business.
Doder: I have a friend who has a large business interest in
Russia. He runs five or six factories, and I know from him that
you have to hire security to do anything. It’s not a normal
operation, let’s not kid ourselves. In other words, the former
security people who don’t have jobs become part of a mafia.
Tu man: Different countries have different security problems.
For most transition countries, the initial problem was physical
security, and then technical security. Croatia also started with
the development of physical and technical security systems,
but I do not believe in general that we should be satisfied with
data protection and communication security. On the other
hand, some countries developed all those systems under very
precise legal norms and other measures necessary for the
development of security systems. Having that in mind, I think
what Todor said about education in this area is important.
But there is not much formal education available on
Intelligence, at least in the public education system. Our jour-
nal, National Security and the Future, is the only one in
Croatia and in the transition countries. I hope the journal will
provide professional and scientific articles which can con-
tribute to both formal and informal education on Intelligence
and national security. 
In the first ten years of Croatia’s existence, we established a
Diplomatic Academy, a Military War School, and an
Intelligence Academy. A year or two ago, General Æosiæ,
Admiral Domazet, and I prepared a proposal for a National
Security Academy or National Security School. The basic idea
was to combine the Diplomatic and Intelligence Academy
and the War School, in order to concentrate the intellectual
resources and facilities of our small country. The idea was not
to discount the differences between Intelligence, diplomacy,
and military, but to offer diverse national security programs in
one school, and to integrate that school into the University.




























There is an interesting review in the journal Intelligence and
National Security. Two years ago, they published the names
of people who took doctorates in Intelligence. They provide
20 or 30 pages with the names and titles of doctoral theses.
I think we can expect the subject to become a regular uni-
versity subject in the near future.  In the European countries,
at least, the introduction of a new scientific discipline in uni-
versity programs always goes from the top down. A new dis-
cipline first appears as a subject on the postgraduate level,
and then later in graduate studies. When Intelligence
becomes a subject of scientific research and an element of
university education, public opinion will change on the role
and objectives of Intelligence agencies. That fact will impact
on the education and selection of professionals for different
national security services. In other words, education will be
available for everybody, which presents a certain element of
risk.  Both good guys and bad guys can educate themselves
on the same topics. Anyhow, I believe that in the future we
can expect European countries to offer Intelligence as an
academic subject at the university. As a result, people will not
only be educated to work in governmental and non-govern-
mental centers or agencies, but will also have an impact on
the methods, tehniques, and development of the Intelligence
services.
Lacoste: This is a very important issue.  This type of education
is not only for future specialists in Intelligence. It is also nec-
essary for understanding various branches of universal knowl-
edge.  I have observed that there is a legal aspect, in consti-
tutional as well as criminal law.  There is a sociological aspect
and a psychological aspect; for example, if you want to
understand how Hitler’s or Stalin’s brain operated.  There is
also an historical aspect, which is probably the main one,
since historians normally take all these aspects into account.
And this is why I personally tried to organize a group of
French scholars – individuals from different backgrounds -
police, diplomacy, sociology, army, Intelligence services, law
faculties, etc., - to take part in a three year long university
seminar in order to avoid the typical characteristics of the
“French Intelligence culture”. 
I am convinced that when professional Intelligence officers
from different countries meet, they will be in a better position
to address common threats such as international terrorism or
arms smuggling, and also to discover better ways to solve
their own problems.  In a way, it is the kind of work we are





























Cosic: We spent some time on the selection of curricula for the
Croatian Academy of National Security, and there were some
very interesting findings regarding curriculum composition.
We analyzed the curricula and courses of leading education-
al institutions around the world in the areas of business
administration, public administration, and information
resource management and security. State of the art education
on the Intelligence community and administration requires
courses like strategic leadership, cyber-battle-space, cyber-
war, organizational management, e-finance, and so forth.
Selecting curricula in public administration, business admin-
istration, and information science must be properly done to
meet expectations and needs in education and training of the
Intelligence administration and community in the information
age.
Stolz: If I may, I would like to change the subject a little bit and
talk about terrorism. International terrorism. Now you can
disagree, but I will submit that we vastly overrate internation-
al terrorism, and spend an enormous amount of time on a
subject that should be broken down into its individual parts.
Now when I say terrorism, I refer to the generally accepted
definition: killing innocent people for political purposes. It is
not terrorism when Palestinians and Israels shoot each other
or throw rocks at each other. That is not terrorism. A bomb in
the public square is. A bomb on a destroyer is arguable. A
bomb on the USS Cole is arguable.  ETA’s terrorist activities
are indeed a problem, but it is a problem for Spain and
France, not an international problem.  In the same vein, the
IRA and the PIRA are a problem for the United Kingdom and
Ireland, not for the international community. Pakistan,
Kashmir; that is a problem, but that’s a potential war, it is not
terrorism. They are killing each other every chance they get. I
won’t go through them one by one, but take Iran, for exam-
ple. They have an agenda, and it’s largely anti-US and anti-
Israeli. I’m not saying we shouldn’t take a look at these
things, but these international counterterrorism centers are
police matters in many cases. I happened to be in Geneva
when the huge explosion took place in Oklahoma. Our for-
mer congressman from Oklahoma, who was the head of the
House Intelligence Committee, said “Those Arabs will pay for
what they have done.” And of course, it was home grown. We



























Dedijer: I’m sorry, but the British services’ terrorism is a poor
people’s war. You can see this in Israel, where they devel-
oped the technique of throwing stones. It is a wonderful
invention. Fighting for the independence of Palestinians
against tanks, planes, everything else.  That is another way of
looking at terrorism. 
Doder: Terrorism is also when thieves empty a bank account or
similar actions by using hackers. Take the recent love virus.
What hasn’t been mentioned in the papers is that the virus
was capable of getting passwords from bank accounts. It is
now technically possible to send a virus which includes the
capability to collect passwords from bank accounts and clean
them out.  It seems to me that that is an act of terrorism,
because it invades my security. Maybe everything I have is in
an account.
Stolz: My definition is the killing of uninvolved people for a polit-
ical purpose. That is my definition.
Lacoste: I am no longer active in current Intelligence events, but
I am wondering why the press never mentions a very obvious
Intelligence goal; namely, to discover where Milosevic’s
money is?  It has been in Cyprus, it is certainly in various
other banks, but it happens to be a type of information that
is covered by the “law of silence”. Sometimes there are indis-
cretions about other dictators’ fortunes.  I read an article on
the plane two days ago about the money the former Nigerian
leader had stolen from his people.  Two or three billion dol-
lars, which is not a small amount, were deposited in a
Western bank. The money is certainly being used to generate
new profits.  When I asked questions about this to top finan-
cial authorities or politicians, I never received a clear answer.
They preferred to “bury their heads in the sand”, the “ostrich
approach” as we say in French, than to raise such controver-
sial issues publicly. 
Kerr: It is not hard in today’s world to understand where money
goes, what happens to it, who owns it, and where it is
deposited. The problem is that the international banking
community frowns on people interfering in that process. And
it’s possible to interfere in it, but if you intervene in the bank-
ing process you bring the wrath of a lot of people down on





























Shebarshin: I want to add to what Dick Stolz said about inter-
national terrorism. Dick pointed out quite correctly that ter-
rorism has specific roots in every part of the world.  Terrorism
in the USA (remember Oklahoma) is one thing.  Quite differ-
ent is what happens in Kashmir.  It is an offshoot of a real,
undeclared war, which has been going on between India and
Pakistan for fifty-odd years. 
I think that people who inveigh against international terrorism
often do not rely on hard facts. We hear a lot about the inter-
national character of terrorism in Chechnya and Afghanistan,
about the almost mythical Bin Laden, and the convergence of
Russian and American interests in this respect.  And there is
no doubt that it is the duty of all civilized states and their
Intelligence organizations to eradicate terrorism in whatever
shape it appears. 
But one would expect hard evidence of the Taliban assistance
to Chechen terrorists, or of their connection to anti-American
acts in the Middle East.  There is none.  At the same time,
Taliban enjoys the support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates, all respectable states, but which sup-
port a regime labeled “terrorist”. 
I doubt the existence of effective working links between real
terrorist groups of various persuasions. Such links would run
counter to the very secretive nature of terrorism.  Any outside
connection, an extra person admitted to a terrorist group,
sharply reduces its chances of success.  Frankly, I regret the
deficiency of contacts between terrorists of different countries,
because they could have made penetration by specials serv-
ices so much easier. 
During the Afghan war, we managed to trace numerous con-
nections between the Afghan opposition (who could have
easily been labelled terrorists) and outside forces.  They con-
sisted of our current good partners:  the United States, China,
Pakistan, etc. Weapons supplied by them to Afghans, i.e.
Stingers, are still killing people in terrorist acts. Yes, the
Afghan opposition was getting support from Islamic organi-
zations, but mainly moral support; they were supplied with
propaganda material and Korans, but rarely with arms,
unless the shipment was paid for by one of the countries men-
tioned, and they practically never got money.  So let us not
be duped by the myth of ideologically motivated Islamic sol-
idarity, especially in the field of terrorism..
Kerr: There is a difference between terrorism today and terrorism
10 – 15 years ago, when there was a fair amount of evidence
of state-sponsored terrorism. In other words, there were ter-
rorist organisations who learned tactics and trained together


























where a state is actually helping to organize and support ter-
rorism. From a U.S. perspective, I think one of the more effec-
tive things that U.S. Intelligence has done is to preempt ter-
rorist attacks, to stop them before they can conduct attacks.
One of its real successes has been its cooperation with other
organizations to preempt acts of terrorism. During the Iraq,
terrorists were sent out and many of them were caught.  After
the recent bombings of the Embassies in Africa, other people
clearly involved in training were picked up in Africa. So that’s
a very legitimate role for Intelligence. 
We’ve also been talking about information, which is out there
everywhere swirling around. It seems to me one of the most
interesting problems for the future is disinformation and
deception, using the very systems that we are talking about.
There’s the potential to inform people in a way you would not
like them to be informed. 
Doder: The real problem is that the first spin you put on a piece
of information becomes the prevailing view. The first spin is
put by the guys who leak it. There’s nothing that you can do.
You know, the Clinton White House has been marvelous at
that on the domestic level. If something’s brand new, they
immediately say it’s six years old. It’s the spin that colors the
information and the speed it’s disseminated, because we
have 24 hour news channels. The spin is floated in a certain
way and then you have the talking heads, who know nothing
about anything, but have to talk about and discuss it in the
original context. I can see how a foreign government can
introduce something like this. The Russians were excellent at
that. I’ll tell you a story about when there was an assassina-
tion attempt on Brezhnev in 1969.  All of the U.S. journalists
were there, we saw the cosmonauts and the motorcades
coming into Borovisky gate and it was all on television. All of
a sudden, the television broadcasters lost their connections
and we outside of the gate couldn’t see anything. The lim-
ousines went in. The point is, a day later the Russians leak the
story that there was a crazy guy who was shooting at the cos-
monauts.  If you’re given information that a crazy guy tried to
kill the cosmonauts, what do you do?  I was working then for
UPI and I wrestled with the problem. 
Shebarshin: They made a TV film on that, which I saw recently
on the first channel. A documentary.
Kerr: Of course my experience as a Intelligence officer is that the
first report is nearly always wrong or partial or distorted.  My
first reaction when someone says something has been shot
out of the sky or something has happened is: “Don’t anybody
move for a moment. Let’s be calm about this, let’s make sure



























Dedijer: All scientific discoveries are disinformation for most
people, because they don’t understand them. It’s totally out
of their world. And that was the case with the bomb. So all
information can be disinformation for somebody. Now when
you do it on purpose, that’s another thing. 
Lacoste: Former international Intelligence problems were direct-
ly linked to international relations, security, and military
affairs.  Now they more than ever overlap with traditionally
“internal” security problems.  For example, terrorism is obvi-
ously a matter of concern for foreign Intelligence, but it also
lies within the responsibility of police agencies. All
Intelligence agencies nowadays must admit that police offi-
cers have a specific knowledge aobout the criminal world,
that they have a better understanding of the criminal mental-
ity and their courses of action. We must accept those facts,
even if they create difficulties in managing interservice rival-
ries. I observed such problems in my country, when there was
an increase in Islamic terrorism during the Lebanese conflict,
and later on, with Algerian terrorism.  The perceptions were
not the same as seen through the eyes of police and of coun-
terintelligence officers, putting aside their traditional bureau-
cratic hostility.  I believe that Intelligence services and police
agencies are complementary, and that they must discuss and
compare their views, which means that there must exist a
strong political authority to listen to both sides and impose its
decision.  Unfortunately, politicians generally prefer to play
one agency against the other in order to maintain their per-
sonal power.  This is a basic principle of Machiavellian poli-
tics, but it does not serve the country’s best interests. 
Leijonhielm: Just a comment about validating information. You
could argue that deception and disinformation works. I
believe that is the conclusion we must draw from history,
especially if it is constructed at a high level or by the state
itself. There is, however, a large difference between disinfor-
mation regarding smaller subjects and deception on a
national scale. I would argue that the Soviet Union managed
for decades to spread disinformation about its economy and
military strength. This worked very effectively, and led to over-
estimation of the Soviet economic and, subsequently, military
strength in the West. The deception was not discovered until
someone detected that, in fact, there existed a large budget
deficit. So the pieces slowly fell into place. My other remark
is that we also have the problem with disinformation given
unintentionally, which is much harder to detect. Continuous
and systematic overestimates of a country´s economic per-



























to all statistical, primary sources of production and financial
transactions. I would go so far as to argue that in many tran-
sition countries, but also other European countries, the true
state of  the economy is only partially known.
Doder: Take for example the Soviet statistics on the production
of tractors. They produced roughly 2.7 million tractors per
year. The total number of tractors in the country was about
2.9 percent of that.  You look at the export figures and they
should read that about 180,000 were exported annually.  As
you can see, millions of tractors are missing.  In regard to the
Soviet military budget figures, the figure stood at 17.9 billion
rubles in 1968, and in 1982, it wa slightly less – 17.82 rubles
– and the Russians were fighting a war at that time in
Afghanistan.  The figures were meaningless. 
Tu man: We could also discuss the value of information and
role of disinformation. First, there is a certain basic prejudice
or belief that information is synonymous with reality.
Obviously that is not the case, because today everybody -
from Government officials, to businesses, athletes and film
stars  - has a spokesperson who tries to reduce the amount
of bad press or negative perceptions and increase the posi-
tive coverage;  not necessarily to fabricate, but at least to
obscure certain details or to augment insignificant informa-
tion which protects the image of the person or institution. That
is the problem with the value of information. The question is,
what represents reality in information? And how can we veri-
fy it? What kind of feedback can we get? We have the same
problem not only internally in one country, among different
groups, but also when there is a conflict of interest between
countries. For example, the other day we discussed some-
thing which was not known to those of us who were not
involved in Operation Storm in ’95.  Several years after the
operation, there were attempts to convince the general pub-
lic that Americans supported the Croatian Army during
Operation Storm, and that, without that support, the Croatian
Army would not have won. The fact is that in the summer of
’95, the Americans were warning the Croatian Government
not to run the operation, and in fact telling them they were
not allowed to undertake it.  And what is the general percep-
tion today of Operation Storm? There have been many efforts
to reshape that perception. 
From my point of view, information itself is not knowledge,
and the value of unevaluated information is exaggerated.  If
something is available to the public, this does not mean it is
accurate. Information can contain not only facts, but also




























udice, wishful thinking, and so on. Therefore, a critical
approach to information is necessary. What I would like to
say is that a large part of our knowledge of the world is based
on ignorance. That is something we have got to admit.
Stolz: Misinformation, as you just suggested, is when someone
who really doesn’t know the facts disseminates misinforma-
tion;  this is in opposition to disinformation, which is deliber-
ate, and usually state-generated or institutional.  I think this is
a  distinction we have to keep in mind as analysts. We have
“spin doctors” who sell their version of events to the public.
What is the real story there? Then you get some bad stuff,
which still bothers me, and which is not state inspired; for
example, the crazy theory about the CIA selling crack cocaine
in Los Angeles. There are still people who believe that.
Dedijer: I want to raise a very important issue for the journal: the
issue of secrecy and increasing transparency. Secrecy is
essential in all human activities, including Intelligence. Now,
Intelligence organizations are extremely bureaucratic. One
man from the CIA man wrote very eloquently that 95% of the
secrecy of Intelligence organizations is intended to hide fail-
ures and stupidity. 
Boyadjiev: As an example, the Bulgarian Parliament tried to
pass a law in 1993 that all state secrets up to October 13,
1992, when the opposition came to power, were no longer
secret. The next government tried to do the same thing. The
only difference was that it changed the date to the date of its
election victory.  Fortunately, both attempts were unsuccess-
ful, at least for now, since attempts are still being made. Here
you have a good precedent as to how the problem of secrets
can be resolved.
Dedijer: I started turning against Tito when I realized that people
were being punished not for committing crimes, but for point-
ing out that crimes were being committed.  That was one rea-
son Communism disappeared.  The biggest social experi-
ment in human history. 
Shebarshin: The greatest social experiment was not socialism,
but Christianity, and it’s still continuing.  
Kerr: I can’t let Stevan off the hook.  The idea that secrecy is
designed to prevent the uncovering of failures and incom-
pentence is absolutely wrong. First of all, most secrecy is
introduced into the system before you know whether the
action will be a failure or a success. I think that’s greatly
overexaggerated. I just believe we trumpet most of our fail-



























writes about the failures and the occasional fiasco. Very few
people write about and understand the successes, because
they are usually more complicated, and success does not
make as good a story as failure. 
Doder: I taught a class in contemporary public policy at the
University in Washington, to 30 students. I had them read the
Howard Kurtz book, “Spin Cycle”, about how information is
manipulated and so forth. But even before they had read this
book, they said that none of them took seriously anything the
Government said. They thought the press was manipulative
and untruthful, and, strangely enough, their attitude towards
television was the most positive because felt that pictures pro-
vided a greater amount of knowledge. I know that the
Kennedy administration did a great deal to enthuse and
inspire young people to perform public service and so forth.
So I think information is not what we are really talking about.
Mr. Dedijer is probably talking about something else:  covert
action.  Of course you have to have secrecy in the
Intelligence services. It’s covert action, and the temptation to
use it from one administration to another, that presents the
problem; for instance, using the CIA the same way that the
Kremlin used the KGB, as an arm of the executive. You know,
some directors resisted, but some did not. And that’s a real
problem. Then you get the blame, no matter what, for some
cockamamie scheme. 
W olf: I want to say a few words about covert actions, or as we
call them, active measures. Of course there’s a difference
between false information and disinformation. But looking
back, I would say that the success of our activities in this field
was zero.  Of course there were activities, we had false doc-
uments, we used false documents to make the threat from
NATO clearer to the public.  Or, for example, we prepared
falsified German documents, based on actual ones, to help
our Bulgarian friends compromise the West German foreign
policy toward Turkey.  The only result was that our department
issued a report that year about numerous activities they had
undertaken. There was a brief mention in the papers, but that
was it.  Perhaps your experiences have been different. The
only example I remember that succeeded in influencing pub-
lic opinion, if only for a short period, was a document pub-
lished by a well-known East German professor who special-
ized in this issue, stating that AIDS originated in American
prisons, from experiments in American prisons, and so on.
The problem was that I myself believed this was true, and that




























sure, but I think it came from Moscow.  So though I do not
want to underestimate this problem, the evidence used dur-
ing my trials, in documents and witness statements about “ter-
rible” actions and measures, was over-estimated. 
19.7
Kerr: I think we have probably run the course for today’s dis-
cussion.  I think the issue that you raised here will come up in
the next session about covert action. 
Agrell: I would only like to make a short final comment to
General Boyadjev.  I think we complain a lot about the media
and all the shortcomings and unpredictability of the media,
but maybe there is one hidden advantage of this, and that is
that in the end, it’s very difficult to predict manipulation of the
media. One never knows what result one might achieve have
from the manipulation, and this a marketing problem every-
one who tries to influence the media has: they can’t predict
the impact of what they are doing. They are investing enor-
mous resources with very little effect, and then, when they are
doing nothing, everything blows up in their face and nobody
can in retrospect explain why. Why didn’t that work and why




























Ethics and legal norms for Intelligence and
national security
Intelligence and policy makers; Intelligence and the public; ethics
in special operations and misinformation; Intelligence and
responsibility; national security and human rights; etc.
Moderators: General Todor Boyadjiev, General Marcus Wolf
W olf: It’s hard to find a starting point forthe discussion, because
you may all have different points of view on the problem of
legal and ethical norms. On the one hand, I think it is nec-
essary to talk about international law as a precondition for
the problems of legal regulations or legal terms in the servic-
es. But if we do that, we have some problems, because this
would mean that national governments are adjusting their
actions to international law, and the rules and decisions of
the United Nations. We know that in practice there are some
points of difference.  Even existing international norms, con-
ventions and treaties are not respected in an honorable way.
This morning I used the example of bacterial weapons, and
we know there exists an international convention against
them, signed in 1975 by 143 states, but the weapons still
exist.  Many conventions are not respected, for a variety of
reasons; one is because they are being used peacefully for
scientific studies and research. In the morning, we discussed
the problem of terrorism. What is terrorism? Of course the
issue of terrorism or international crimes must be included in
the judicial and legal rules for the services.  We can at least
begin the discussion with very simple but important questions:
human life. Who has the right to kill, to give such an order?
Or should it be totally banned? I remember problems and
discussions that arose after the retirement of Willy Brandt, in
connection with the case of Guillaume, who was under my
responsibility.  Is it possible to establish a zone of protection
around leading persons, presidents, or prime ministers, an
area the services are prohibited from entering? It was said
that Honecker told German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt dur-




























had existed, he would have given the order to remove him.
But I never got an order not to recruit agents in the
Chancellor’s office. These are just some examples we can
use to direct our discussion about the ethics and legal norms
for Intelligence and national security, but now I will give Todor
a chance to speak about this issue.
Boyadjiev: I would like to mention a book in my introduction,
not to make an advertisement, but because this book is
directly connected with our current discussions.
The name of the book is “THE INTELLIGENCE”. It was pub-
lished in Bulgaria in May of last year, and it was number one
on the best selling list for several weeks in a row.
The book is unique in several ways; first, because it is a col-
lective effort of half the people in this room. It includes the
autobiographies of Dick Stolz, Dick Kerr, General
Shebarshin, General Leonov, General Asparuhov, and
myself. 
Each autobiography answers four principal questions: “How
and why did I join the Intelligence service?”; “What was I
doing in Intelligence?”; “How did I leave Intelligence?”, and
“What am I doing now?”
This approach allowed us to collect and compare individual
fates, preserving at the same time the individuality of each
person. The unostentatious conclusion reached is that
Intelligence is a profession with a human face, that people in
working in Intelligence have high motivation and morals, are
patriots, professionals with strong intellect and comprehen-
sive, encyclopedic knowledge; ethical and tolerant; prepared
to look beyond the confines of their special services and
assess the qualities of those who, based on their ideologies,
were their opponents and even enemies. 
The contributions of Admiral Pierre Lacoste and Professor
Miroslav Tudjman come from this structure.
Admiral Pierre Lacoste wrote an excellent piece about his
vision of Intelligence in the 21st Century. My very dear friend,
Professor Tudjman, wrote a very interesting biography – the
biography of the Croatian Intelligence. And General Markus
Wolf, whose autobiography has been published in more than
a dozen languages, supplied the forward. The only authors
that are not in this room are General Brigo Asparuhov – my
colleague for many years and the last Director of the
Bulgarian National Intelligence Service, the “spy of the 20th
Century” Kim Philby, whom I had the privilege to know for
many years, the CIA Director George Tenet, and the director
of the Russian Intelligence, Viacheslav Trubnikov, now First



























All these authors’ papers offer an open and reader-friendly
vision of this worthy, though high-stress, profession “on the
edge”.  
The book achieved its purpose. It gave the readers in
Bulgaria, who have been manipulated for quite some time
into believing that the special services are an “unnecessary
evil”, to learn for themselves that Intelligence is a noble pro-
fession with a human face.
The second part of the book comprises 75 pages, and begins
with interesting reflections of the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency Director, George Tenet. Although the reflections
address the rhetorical question “Does America need the
CIA?”, they go far outside the national parameters of an
Intelligence service, and provide a serious and profound
insight into the future of this profession under new, existing
conditions.
What follows is a “virtual” “round table. There are seven
independent subjects of discussion in several sections: How
do Intelligence agents come into the world, or Education for
Intelligence; Women in Intelligence; In what way is control
exercised over Intelligence; What does “friendly” Intelligence
mean, or how to steal economic, financial, and technologi-
cal secrets of allies, partners, competitors and opponents; Is
there any room for cooperation between state and private
Intelligence; Is Intelligence becoming a part of the new busi-
ness culture, and how can we make it smarter; Are there ex-
agents in Intelligence and what do Intelligence veterans do
after they cease their active work. And the last topic is
“Cooperation in ‘the game without rules’, and should there
be any rules for this game?”
The “round table” participants do not know each other per-
sonally; they don’t meet face to face, and do not answer
questions at the same time, but with a time delay of several
months. Physically, they are separated by a distance of thou-
sands of miles and by an ocean. Nevertheless, they are unit-
ed by their common interest in the topics of this discussion
and by the organizer. In this case, that was my privilege. I was
the only one who met all 38 participants, asked the ques-
tions, and used  authentic quotes from the answers received
for the virtual “round table”.
Gathered around this “table” were well-known politicians,
legislators, professors, journalists, publishers, businessmen
and, of course, Intelligence officers – retired and active –
from the United States and the Russian Federation.
Discussions were held in New York, Moscow, and
Washington. 
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You probably know most of the participants, but I would like






Tom Finger – State Department
Valery Kantorov
Laurence Block – the Grandmaster of  American crimi-
nal writers
John Millis – the brilliant professional who decided
(God knows why) to leave this world for a better one.
General Vadim Kirpichenko
Frank Margiotta – Brassey Publishing House
Professor Roy Godson – Georgetown University
General Leonid Shebarshin
Douglas Roberts – Executive Director of
Communication Control Systems Inc.
Army General Philip Bobkov
Victor Iliuhin
Professor Jefferson Adams –Sarah Lawrence College 
Professor Allen Goodman – Georgetown University
Professor Richard Betts – Columbia University, NYC
I am not going to read or translate their discussions on our
topic. I hope you will help us to publish this interesting book
in English, French, Russian, German and other languages,
and then you will have the chance to read it yourself.
I am sure our discussion is not going to radically deviate from
the conclusions in the book. Yes, we will need some new set
of rules: written or unwritten, ratified or just mutually accept-
ed and observed.
I would like to add three more “provocative” questions to
those listed in our program:
Will we have some sort of Vienna Convention for the rules of
the game, which are very often characterized as “games with-
out rules?”
Will we have some type of International Intelligence
Community on a government and state level, on a transna-
tional level, or an NGO level?”
Are we going to revisit the old – new slogan, “Proletarii vseh
stran obediniates” – in our case “Spies of the world, unite”,
to fight common evils, or will we keep to the old Bulgarian
proverb: “Friendship is a good thing, but cheese costs
money”.  Or will it be a combination of both?


























Shebarshin: Concerning rules of the game and the possibility of
a legal convention, I think a convention is possible if major
world powers decide that it is necessary.  It would hardly work
otherwise, because every party involved would find ways to
circumvent it.  The same thing would happen, in my view, to
a hypothetical joint Intelligence service.  National services will
survive under a different guise.  Regarding rules of the game,
the only rule is a ratio between expected results and opera-
tional-political risks.  The ratio is different in times of war or
confrontation than in times of peace.  There exists a sinister
trinity in the fighting of common enemies:  narco-traffic,
organized crime, and terrorism.  Undoubtedly, there is a wide
field for cooperation, but I should note that the components
of this trinity have different significance for different countries,
and consequently for their Intelligence organizations. 
Kerr: Let me look at it from the American perspective. I find it dif-
ficult to imagine the United States agreeing to all-encom-
passing rules that regulate its behavior in this particular area,
or another area, or to have an international Intelligence com-
munity that is truly supportive. I can see one that maybe
assisted on the margins, but I can’t see a complete commit-
ment. It seems to me that for a variety of historical reasons,
the United States still has difficulty with the concept of the
United Nations. Sovereignty issues are very dominant issues,
and I don’t see that mood changing in the foreseeable future
on issues of this sort, not just on Intelligence, but on issues of
internationalism.  I don’t see that from a country that thought
World War I, from a popular point of view, was Europe’s
problem. It was a problem the United States didn’t want to
be involved in. The view was basically the same on World
War II, and it was only the actions of the Japanese that drew
in the United States. So I think from the U.S. perspective, I
don’t see these themes gaining wide support.  There will be
a certain group that will support them, but I don’t see them
gaining national approval. It may even go in the other direc-
tion. I think it’s equally likely that there will be people who will
become disenchanted with internationalism because of its
obvious failures in various places, and will look to a more
independent way as the logical way. I don’t know what my
American friends would say about that or whether they agree. 
Smith: I agree to that, and I’ve never agreed to any set of rules
which regulate Intelligence.
Dedijer: Wait until Chinese capitalists start producing Chinese





























Boyadjiev: I appreciate your opinion on that matter. Wilhelm,
after you pointed out that the only field where there is no co-
operation in United Europe is in the field of Intelligence, I
would like to ask you if you think this is going to continue for-
ever, or can we expect something else?
Agrell: There is a discussion that’s been going on for decades
about Intelligence co-operation to enhance common goals.
Now we see that practically nothing has come out of that. I
don’t think that we will see any quick progress in this area.
Tu man: Maybe we can discuss that from another point of view.
If we all share the same legal and ethical rules there will be
no problems. But there is an immediate problem when the
rules of the game that exist in one country are imposed on the
others, and the other countries or agencies are forced to
observe them. Today we see that sometimes agencies violate
or disrespect the laws of another country, but at the same
time are observing those of their own country. That is also an
ethical and moral dilemma. If somebody is acting to satisfy
national interests and national objectives, but is not following
the rules and legal standards of the opponent or hostile
country, is this a moral dilemma? 
When I held a course in the Intelligence Academy on the
ethics of Intelligence, I asked the students two questions: first,
is spying a moral activity, and second, what motivated them
to join the service? The students could be divided into two
groups based on their responses. For those who believed that
spying was a moral activity, the main motive to join the serv-
ice was patriotism. The other group was not convinced that
spying was a moral activity, and their answers were very
pragmatic: wages, security, personal success, etc. Those
answers assisted me in clarifying many misunderstandings,
especially among beginners in the services.
On the other hand, if the international Intelligence communi-
ty exists, then what are the legal or ethical norms for that
community? There are some forms of multilateral co-opera-
tion among Intelligence agencies. There is the Middle
European Conference, which represents a certain type of co-
operation, at least among the heads of the services. There is
increasing co-operation among two or even three services
acting in joint  operations. 
Obviously, some problems cannot be avoided, but I believe
in certain areas we can establish more effective co-operation
among the services on a multilateral level. Because if the
bilateral co-operation does not include a third country which
has a direct involvement in the issue, then there will be con-
sequences which will impede the effectiveness of the


























from bilateral to multilateral cooperation, but that changes
will go more slowly than we would  expect. That is the logic
of the globalization process, which will be the driving force
for multilateral cooperation. But at the some time, that coop-
eration will be defined by national or group interests,
because globalization is an interaction between entities that
are striving to protect and promote their personal, group, and
national identity and interests. Globalization means accept-
ing common rules, but for the benefit and development of
their own national interests. 
Boyadjiev: I’m afraid I might ask questions that may take us
away from the more serious discussion, but I would like to
rephrase one of the questions. When we are talking about
Intelligence, we are talking from the position of Intelligence
against. But very often Intelligence is Intelligence for. I would-
n’t mind, for example, if there were CIA officers in the CIA
station in Sofia advising the American government about the
current situation in Bulgaria, the trends and developments.  In
this way, they could promote a more positive American poli-
cy toward Bulgaria.  This is acceptable. But don’t you think
that there is a need for some rules governing Intelligence
activities? Maybe not written and formally ratified, but mutu-
ally accepted and mutually followed. Maybe not in the imme-
diate future, but after a certain period of time.
Stolz: You pushed my button when you said written. I think that
Miro is talking in general, ad hoc, about cooperation on cer-
tain issues such as narcotics, crime and terrorism, about
cases where one can help the other for common objectives,
but if you start writing things down, in my opinion you have
lost it, you’ve lost the secret. Once you start writing some-
thing down, it’s lost, Dusko Doder will find it. Second, the
lawyers will take over. I think that the rules can be discussed,
but to get down to the point of writing a document, I don’t
think that’s going to happen.
Kerr: I agree with what Dick said earlier. He agrees with most of
the things that I say, and I agree with most of the things he
says. But I think he’s been even more even restrictive than I
would have been. I think that it would be very unwise to tie
your hands, to say that you will not act when there could be
a situation calling for action at some other point in time.  I
think even in an area where we have much common agree-
ment, terrorism for instance, or nuclear proliferation,  I per-
sonally would argue that the United States should not tie its
hands and prohibit action against terrorists or people in the
proliferation business who have violated someone else’s sov-
ereignty. If it was sufficiently important from a national per-



























ereignty, and could you agree on that in an international law?
Could you write a law that would allow that exception? I
can’t believe you could. So my argument would be you can’t
do that.
Agrell: Most laws have that. If there is no supreme national secu-
rity interest.
Kerr: Then the law becomes meaningless.
W olf: Let me say something about this. I don’t know why I have
to moderate this topic.  I am a notorious optimist, but I am
not so optimistic as to believe that we can find any basis for
legal or ethical norms.  I think what Dick Kerr said is realistic.
Of course we can discuss, as everyone can, the ethical norms
of Intelligence services, and I think that the most realistic way
to reach some respected norms, legal ethic norms, is via pub-
lic opinion. If we return to the question of terrorism in
Germany, there are great misgivings about the newly-legis-
lated right of the services and police to use special and tech-
nical measures to more closely control a room by going in
with microphones and so on. I think this is very characteristic,
because there are grave misgivings in our countries in Europe
about the abuses by internal services, Intelligence services,
and police as well. I think it’s the same in America. 
Kerr: No, I actually think it’s going the other way in America. I
think we’re being allowed to be more intrusive. Police and
the FBI are being allowed more leeway.  And do you agree
with wire tapping and the intrusiveness into what we would
call our first amendment rights? 
W olf: I think we have to keep in mind that this is an open dis-
cussion that’s taking place in most countries. 
Dedijer: Intelligence organizations are going to listen to what the
government tells them. And when the government tells them,
look you’ve got to make an international agreement on
Interpol or money laundering, the United States is going to
agree on that, and then the Intelligence organization just
goes and does it. There is no discussion.
W olf: Let me just say two things. The question is, do we have
effective, democratic, parliamentary control of the services? I
am asked this very often by the public. My answer is different
from yours, but I said no, there’s no effective control in some
areas; financing, for example. In Germany, there is legislation
prohibiting the export of weapons to crisis areas. It’s a very
clear law, but they were nonetheless exported, and the
German Intelligence service participated and, therefore,
there is a lot of suspicion about the behavior of the services.



























such control is necessary. So we must discuss legal and ethi-
cal norms, but without illusions about the possibility of adopt-
ing an international convention.  This may happen in coming
decades, but not now.  
Lacoste: I wrote several articles about that specific point, ethics
for Intelligence service people. We have had to deal with sen-
sitive situations in the history of my country.  We have had to
manage periods of great danger, dealing with terrorism,
upheavals, and revolutionary groups.  I remember, for exam-
ple, that the end of the Algeria war provoked a political and
military revolt during which a group of “lost” soldiers tried a
kind of “pronunciamento” against De Gaulle’s government.
The OAS conspirators had contacted members of the mob,
criminals and murderers.  Some people in the legal govern-
ment proposed recruiting other criminals to fight against
them.  I strongly opposed such a strategy; it is a terrible mis-
take to make contracts with organized crime to conduct clan-
destine, government-sponsored tasks.  Sooner or later you
will lose control of them.  
It’s still a big issue in the contemporary world.  In Africa, in
Bosnia and Kosovo, Islamic “mujahedeens” from Afghanistan
were recruited, as well as Albanian Mafia godfathers, to fight
against Serb criminal militias.  It is a a very dangerous poli-
cy.  I believe Intelligence services should never cross that line. 
Stolz: I was going to comment on where we differ on the parlia-
mentary democracies control of Intelligence services.  In our
case, one of the basic reasons that they can do it is money.
The budget comes, technically, from the House of
Representatives, but the Congress in the last 15 years will not
sign the appropriations without knowing the specifics of some
cases. What’s this for? What are you going to do with this?
And then they say they will not give you the money for this,
but they will give you the money for that. So I’m basically
optimistic, and this is a area where we’re on the right track.
Doder: I wanted to add to this because I think Dick is right and,
in fact, they are subject to scrutiny.  For example, export of
weapons.  Politicians were behind it. And even then they
could only use the CIA as a back-up. They went to the
National Security Council. They sent Dexter and North out
there, and it was Casey who engineered the whole thing. But
the agency was not involved.  Kennedy said, “Well, you know,
they should assassinate Castro.” It was not the agency that
came up with the idea to go assassinate Castro. But unless
you have a presidential order, they will not act. Although
sometimes if your director is a political director, you can get




























Lacoste: In France there is practically no political control by the
Parliament, but there are several administrative controls;
namely, to preserve individual rights. We are very strict about
unauthorized use of listening devices by police and Secret
official services; they do verify that those few people whose
private life is under surveillance for criminal or security rea-
sons are registered in the short lists specifically authorized by
judges or top governmental authorities. 
Leonov: I would like to say a couple words about ethics in tech-
nical means of collecting information. In the morning session,
we mentioned the globalization of information. We see that
information sources are multiplying from year to year. The
access to them is protected by electronic protection systems,
which are only one element in the historical competition
between aggressive weapons and passive protection. Their
most dangerous enemy is the computer hacker. For years
now, hackers have circumvented sophisticated protection sys-
tems. Sometimes they have done it illustrate their ability to
humiliate the inventors of defensive systems, but on other
occasions, they entered information banks of financial insti-
tutions and stole large sums of money. We have examples of
penetration into secret information sites of sensitive military
and administrative institutions.  The hackers usually work
alone, but they are often internationally organized, hold con-
gresses, and exchange experiences. They might even have
their own newsletters and magazines. Meanwhile, if they are
operating by themselves, the danger is relatively small, but
one cannot be sure that some of the Intelligence structures
are not utilizing the genius of hackers to obtain sensitive infor-
mation from highly protected sources linked with national
security. This sort of hacker is protected and supported by the
state, and oriented toward the Intelligence structure; he may
even be an element of future Intelligence. Intelligence ethics
were always very relative. In the years of the Cold War, we
had several contacts with the CIA and, as far as I know, the
only thing we agreed upon was not to use violence against
each other. It was the beginning and the end of ethics. So I
think that if breaking codes is condoned as legal, why should-
n’t the skills of the hackers be accepted one day as well?
Cryptography serves the same function as electronic protec-
tion systems. The use of hackers may be economically bene-
ficial, effective, and low risk.  Maybe it is time to elaborate a
written or tacitly approved code of ethics in Intelligence activ-
ities, a code outlining prohibited activities, such as blackmail,
physical violence, intentional misinformation, hacking, and



























Agrell: We are actually discussing two different things, although
they are linked on some levels. One is a problem on the
national level, the problem of parliamentary control of
national laws applying to Intelligence and security agencies.
Since the 1970’s, most Western European countries have
had some form of parliamentary control over Intelligence and
security agencies, but with little success. In Norway in the mid
1990s, the so-called Lund Commission was formed to inves-
tigate the internal Intelligence and security services in
Norway, from 1945 all the way to the mid 1990s. One of the
findings was that the majority of secret Intelligence operations
were directed against Norwegian citizens. But the most
important finding was that parliamentary control over the
Norwegian security service had been absolutely ineffective,
since it was simply  a formal structure lacking insight into the
actual operations. That was a bit discouraging. It’s a long
road from formal parliamentary control to real citizen control.
I don’t think we’ve even started down that road.  Now when
we come to the international level, we are not talking about
parliamentary control, but about norms and international
conventions.  We have seen little of that, although we do
have one international agreement between the United States
and the Soviet Union on avoiding incidents at sea, which is
basically an agreement on Intelligence activities within a spe-
cific area, in order to avoid mutually dangerous situations. So
here you have a mutual interest in regulating a specific case
of Intelligence gathering, which prohibited, for example, fly-
ing your aircraft over the other side’s naval vessel, which
could be perceived as a threat. In other areas, such as killing
people, there were unwritten rules during the Cold War.  For
example, most of the western services knew the identities of
the Soviet Intelligence officers working in their country, but
they were not expelled because that was part of the game.  In
the mid 1980s, the Thatcher government expelled Soviet
Intelligence officers from Great Britain on a massive scale.
This was a violation of the rules of the game. The Brits had
done something that you were not allowed to do according
to the unwritten rules of the game. In the good old days of
the Cold War, we had a lot of these Vienna Conventions.
Now the problem is the hackers, the new entities, criminals,
and all those people in the gray zones.  Today it is much more
difficult to get an unwritten consensus on anything. Of course
we can outlaw hackers. We have a law in Sweden against




























hacker committed?  In his bedroom where he sits in front of
his computer, or whatever place in the world that he has
invaded? So we can write all kinds of laws, but they don’t
mean anything. 
Kerr: I’m following up on this issue of information and hacking.
I think it’s going to be very attractive for countries with limit-
ed resources to turn to information hacking, because it is easy
to hire the people. It is not resource intensive and can be very
effective. It seems to me that it is a very attractive weapon to
use, particularly for those who are unequal in other areas of
weaponry.  I think there are laws in nearly every country
against hackers at this stage, but it would be almost impossi-
ble to prevent hacking from occurring. 
Leijonhielm: I think in most countries you do have laws on that,
and we also have a legal tradition in this field, which has
shown that the hackers are usually tried and sentenced in
their own countries; at least that is the case in the Nordic
countries. So I don’t think there would be a problem creating
a convention on this issue. I have a few remarks on
Intelligence towards third countries. Sometimes there are dif-
ferent legal problems and laws in these areas, so I am hesi-
tant about the possibility of creating a convention. It would be
useless in practice.  As far as efforts to coordinate Intelligence
are concerned, I wouldn’t be as pessimistic as Wilhelm Agrell
was regarding a combined European effort in the Intelligence
field, because the existence of a European common security
policy, and the creation of a military capacity involving some
250,000 soldiers, will force the European Union to create
some sort of working Intelligence unit. It would seem logical,
although I admit it’s not in the pipeline yet.  Another point to
consider is that Intelligence cooperation in Europe has start-
ed to develop from the bottom up; for example, in the case
of police Intelligence, which is important since Russia is also
involved. The transition countries everywhere have been
forced into expanding cooperation,  because they are all
plagued by rising criminality.
Doder: But I’ve been always under the impression that the
majority of KGB resources were diverted into stealing tech-
nology. 
Leijonhielm: Russia, I believe, is among the most rapidly
advancing nations in this area. At least a hundred institutions
in Moscow are dealing with information warfare, and are
making a substantial contribution to that field. It is a new
problem and possibly also a worrying one to Russia, because
it feels vulnerable, which can be seen in the way they treat this
problem in their military and security doctrines. It is an inter-


























nations are more or less vulnerable to information warfare. In
Sweden, we have initiated IT, or information warfare units, in
order to use them in operations, which is a combination of
offensive information warfare or operations, and Intelligence. 
Jackovich: Just to go back for a second to something that Mr.
Agrell said. I found that through the crystalization of the entire
discussion, we really have been at two different levels; one is
national coordination within a particular state, or oversight by
government and legislative bodies, and the second, entirely
different, is coordination among national Intelligence agen-
cies which, it would seem to me, boils down to ad hoc situa-
tions when we are unable to codify things, but can coordinate
things internationally. But often, the oversight exists on paper
but not in reality. You also have to make certain that respon-
sible bodies are performing the oversight. I know in the
United States, the concern is always who you brief on a par-
ticular committee. Which committee do you brief? It’s not so
much when to brief but who it is, and what the political moti-
vations might be for subsequent actions if that happens. But
in different countries, it might work in different ways. If you
have, for example, a presidential commission, in some coun-
tries it might work and in some it might not.  You have to have
a very responsible president or prime minister or someone to
whom the Intelligence services answers. The commission or
body has to have a certain amount of autonomy or inde-
pendence, not only in terms of oversight and briefings, but in
terms of rooting out corruption. I’m not that familiar with the
Russian Duma’s oversight of Intelligence services, but I am
familiar with the public report that stated that, between 1995
– 99, there were 200 convictions of Intelligence services per-
sonnel for abuses under the law. That’s very interesting. I am
not that familiar with the Far East, but I know that in Hong
Kong, a presidential, prime-ministerial commission was cre-
ated and given free rein to clean out the Intelligence services
and ensure that corruption and abuses were not prevalent,
and, in fact, it was very successful during a 20-year period.
Now that’s a very long period of time, but if you can turn
around a situation in a particular entity or country in 20
years, that means that after one generation, you have not
only cleaned up the act of an Intelligence service, but you
have instilled confidence in a certain institution. Maybe that is
self-evident, but it is extremely important, because once you
lose that confidence, once people look upon whomever the




























figure - and assume that there is something wrong, that this
person is doing this or this person is doing that simply
because of his position, then the pillars of society begin to
unravel.
Smith: What hasn’t been discussed in great detail is cooperative
action. I’d be interested in hearing the views of various play-
ers, the French, the Russians, the Bulgarians, on covert action
and whether they favor using covert action, and if so, when
they favor using covert action? It seems to me it’s a very
important Intelligence weapon that should not be discarded.
Covert action can be publishing a book, or putting articles in
the newspaper.  Mr. Miloševiæ would be an example of when
covert action might be used, if you have an outlaw govern-
ment which is causing great difficulties to its people and also
potentially to you. Is it justifiable to use covert action to
attempt to change the situation?
Doder: I would volunteer an answer, though I’ve never had any-
thing to do with covert action.  As a matter of principle, I
would try to keep covert action to a minimum.  I think it’s
much more effective to have an analyst write an open piece
and try to place ideas he wants to promote in the Washington
Post or the New York Times.
Smith: Let’s go to something that’s a little bit more active.
Doder: Let me come to the point. The problem with covert action
is: who initiates it? It has to be the president and nobody else.
Then it seems to me there’s never been a clear mandate on
what is permissible and what is not. In another words, is the
killing of a foreign leader permissible?  In the law it’s not. 
Smith: That’s not covert action. You can’t hire someone to
shoot somebody. It’s really not possible to kill people. You
have to organize a political movement or use armed force, or
minimal armed force. Saddam Hussein would be an exam-
ple.
Doder: Let’s take Greece, for instance, which we are both
acquainted with. A sustained effort in Greece was not the
right thing, because during a period of years, we encouraged
and supported the government, and it basically did not reflect
the will of the Greek people. We supported it.
Smith: Well, we supported it insofar as we were there, we dealt
with it; we didn’t support it.
Stolz: I would disagree. There is no such thing as covert action
anymore, and it plays into the hands of people like Milosevic.
The United States government is adrift; we said we’re going
to get rid of Miloševiæ, and not by killing him, but by spend-
ing money, and the same in Iraq.  So what did Mr. Miloševiæ
do? You see! He could and does claim that his opposition is


























Tu man: May I just quote what U.S. Ambassador William
Montgomery said when he was on Croatian TV this year in
August? He was asked where he was going after Croatia. He
answered that he would be located in Hungary as the
American government representative, and his task would be
to get rid of Miloševiæ.  He said he would be in Hungary
because that is the best location to establish contacts with the
opposition, Serbian opposition, to support NGO’s, and all
the other people working to get rid of Milosevic. We see sev-
eral ethical and moral problems here. Even if the main objec-
tive is politically acceptable, the means and methods are
questionable. What kind of support of opposition political
parties should be allowed from abroad? Is it legal and moral
for NGOs to be involved in domestic affairs per the instruc-
tions of a third country, and financed by a third country?
What was the legal, political, and moral position of Hungary,
whose territory was being used for covert operations? There
was a lot of discussion in Hungary about Ambassador
Mongomery’s position in Hungary, because he was using its
territory to facilitate American activities in another country.
We can say that there’s no covert action anymore as part of
an Intelligence operation; basically, an Intelligence operation
is designed for collecting Intelligence, and covert operations
are not collecting or producing Intelligence. We can say, no,
we don’t have any moral dilemmas, because somebody else
is doing the job. 
Stolz: Regarding Ambassador Montgomery, whom we all regard
favorably, that is not what we are talking about. That was a
government policy - however wise or unwise – where the
ambassador wants to meet with people.  And it’s not a secret.
He maybe made a mistake, but that’s not covert action.
Smith: Dick pointed out correctly that it was not covert action
when we announced that we were against Milosevic, and
would encourage his overthrow. Covert action would have
been if we were able to contact someone from the Yugoslav
military and arrange for them to remove him from power
without our hand showing. That would be covert action.
Dedijer: I’m 30 years older than any one of you, so allow me to
talk to you as an older professor. Gentlemen, we’re moving
toward an enlightened capitalist system in the world. All
countries, Latin America, Asia, everywhere except Cuba - and
Castro is even vacillating - he’s bringing out Coca Cola and
so forth - are going that way. Second, of 180 countries in the
world, according to a United Nations report, 95 are democ-
racies, 45 are partial democracies, and 30 are dictatorships.




























problems will come up to confront the entire population.  It’s
not a question of American interest, or another interest. It
doesn’t matter what’s good for the United States, but what’s
good for General Motors. 
Kerr: I don’t agree with you, but I think it’s hard to find specific
data during the last several major confrontations that the
United States or its allies have been involved in, where busi-
ness had an influence on the policy or the outcome.  I think
it’s striking how little influence big business has had on poli-
cy. It didn’t have any impact on Kosovo, on Serbia; it had
very little impact on issues, even though people would argue
that in the Middle East, it was a major force. We say it was all
done for oil, but in my view, it was not all done for oil; it was
done for a whole variety of reasons. But the companies’
involvement, the involvement of the economic leaders of the
world has been surprisingly quiet in these major policy adven-
tures. Why do you think they are going to change? Money.
Dedijer: Because democracy is growing everywhere, and they
are going to force them. Now we have global economics,
social globalization, and legal globalization. Scientific, tech-
nological, and ethical globalization are on the way.  Don’t
think in exclusive terms. 
Shebarshin: Anyone who doesn’t go along with globalization is
going to get a bump on the head. 
Jackovich: Just a short comment. Actually getting back to
something that we started with, the covert action discussion.
The irony is that if you go through a lot of regulation or a lot
of coordination, then you can’t undertake the covert action,
because too many people know about it.  It is no longer
covert and everything becomes violated and then it becomes
silly. That means, basically, that if you want to take effective
action, you don’t go through the coordinated process; but
then, by definition, you have a renegade operation, and
that’s not to be condoned, either.  I think we have some soci-
eties, and some national Intelligence services who have put
themselves in that situation. Just a quick comment on what
we did in Budapest.  It’s generally not a good idea to set up
a shadow embassy, or a shadow operation on the territory of
the neighbor country that you’re trying to deal with, but this
was exceptional. The situation in Serbia and Yugoslavia was
exceptional, but I would also have to agree that the action we
took - and a lot of other things - could have been done a lot
earlier. Doing it in 1999 was a little late; we could have done
it at any time. Not speaking in covert terms, but in terms of
dealing with people, dealing with the democratic elements in
Serbia in this case. We could have set up a operation; we


























W olf: I think we’ve gotten off the topic, but that’s not surprising
because it is a very difficult and broad subject. The question
is, was this our specific topic, because we could discuss glob-
alization until tomorrow morning.   Would you like to speak
or express an opinion?
Lacoste: I have observed that is more difficult than ever for offi-
cial Intelligence services to perform covert actions, especially
in the U.S., because of the very intrusive oversight of the two
powerful Congressional commissions. It is difficult in Bosnia
or Kosovo because of the widespread press coverage. So
there is a temptation for governmental services to call on the
private sector, not only for Intelligence tasks but also for mil-
itary and covert action. The same thing happens in Ruanda,
and Central or Western Africa. That temptation is not as pres-
ent inside the services themselves, because they are profes-
sionally cautious and have their own ethical imperatives, but
it can be found among the politicians.  I have observed that
in my own country; I might remind you that it also happened
with the Watergate affair, when Nixon asked amateurs to per-
form a break-in of the Democratic party offices. I know of
some examples of former Intelligence officers or retired mem-
bers of special forces who have hired themselves out for dubi-
ous causes in return for financial gain.  I think that nowadays,
the specific topic of privatization of Intelligence activities
should be very carefully considered.
W olf: If you all agree I will try to bring this to a conclusion. I
don’t dare try to summarize our discussion on this topic. We
have a common opinion, I think, that at this time it’s impos-
sible or perhaps makes no sense to attempt to write a
Convention on the rules and ethics of this work, but these are
very important points and will continue to be important, and
I think our discussion is constructive. Of course, we who
worked in the Intelligence services, specifically those at this
round table, are all former members, and this is our privilege.
We are able to discuss and talk about everything, which
would become more difficult if a government decides to
impose rules of cooperation on European Intelligence.  I
believe our opinions and discussions can be of some impor-
tance. I think we have come to an end, and I would like to
ask Miroslav to make the final statement.
Tu man: I would like to thank you all, because I believe that dur-
ing these two days we have had interesting discussions. Of
course it was not our intention to reach any spectacular con-
clusions or send messages to the rest of the world, but I
believe that we introduced certain issues, and because of the
experience and knowledge of the participants, these views



























sionals who are dealing with these subjects. Our intention
was to record this meeting and prepare the contents for pub-
lication, and I hope that these discussions will lead to other
discussions and deeper insights. I would like to thank you all
for your efforts. 
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